| After the equity division reform in2006, related laws and regulations have issued about equity incentive, it is a legal basis for the implementation of the management equity incentive of listed companies in China. More and more listed companies announced the management equity incentive plan over the first years of consolidation and specification. Equity incentives is originated in the western developed countries, it is a long-term incentive mechanism which to reduce agency costs, improve operational efficiency and maximize shareholders’ equity, More over some companies receive the corresponding success because of the economic system. In consider of the difference of Western countries and China about economic system the implementation of equity incentive in China whether can improve company performance is a necessary research.This article embarks from the basic incentive theory, on the basis of full study of a large number of literature at home and abroad, combined with the company’s performance evaluation related theory put forward two assumptions, it assumes that the management equity incentive can improve firm performance, and the nature of the state-owned and non-state-owned nature of the company management equity incentive effect on firm performance. To prove hypothesis, this article selects equity incentive plans announced in2006-2011all the listed companies as samples, the proposed data after company of empirical research, found that China’s overall management equity incentive can improve company performance of listed companies, the same as the our country most scholars research results; Overall samples, on the other hand, this article will divided into nature of state-owned and non-state-owned nature of two samples of listed companies, empirical test respectively, found the nature of the non-state-owned listed companies executives equity incentive to promote the company’s performance, and the nature of the state-owned listed companies executives equity incentive level and company performance is not significant linear relationship. However analysis of the performance of listed companies in our country, state-owned listed companies, on average, significantly higher than non-state-owned nature of the performance of listed companies, and individual performance in a relatively stable level, the nature of the non-state-owned listed companies by loss of flow, there is also a high return on equity of outstanding individuals, performance level is uneven, the overall difference in the nature of state-owned listed companies. Comprehensive the above two aspects, this paper argues that non-state-owned nature of developing the equity of listed companies equity incentive, at present the state-owned enterprise listed companies executives equity incentive and corporate performance relationship is not apparent, suggest executives looking for suitable for their own development incentive model to help enterprises improve performance. |
