Research On Enterprise Talent Competition Strategic Decision Model With Game Theory

With the accelerated process of economic globalization, competition amongenterprises becomes increasingly fierce. Talents play a important role in theenterprises’ development. In order to maintain competitive advantage, enterprisescarry out the competition for talent actively. In such a competitive environment,it’s particularly important for enterprises to make talent competition strategicdecision. At present, the talent competition strategic decision was made bydecision-makers based on their experience and subjective judgments in mostenterprises, lacking of the analyses of the mutual influence between enterprisetalent competition strategic decisions. Base on this, the dissertation constructs amodel of enterprise talent competition strategic decision with game theory.In order to construct the model of enterprise talent competition strategicdecision with game theory, the dissertation analyzes the connotation of talentcompetition strategy firstly, and puts forward the point that competitiveness oftalent competition strategy contains both explicit competition and implicitcompetition. Based on the analysis of their relationships, the types of talentcompetition strategy are defined. Second, according to the relevant literature, thedissertation extracts explicit competitive primaries evaluation sub-system, anduses the methods of kendall’s concordance coefficient and paired fourfold tablemethod to screen and confirm the evaluations. At the same time, in accordancewith the definition of implicit competition and screening principles of indicators,the dissertation decides the implicit competition evaluation sub-system byreference to the relevant literature. So the competitiveness evaluation indicatorsystem of enterprise talent competition strategy is achieved. The indicator systemprovides support for the analysis of enterprises’ payoffs in enterprise talentcompetition strategic decision model with game theory. Based on the feature oftalent competition strategic decision and the decision-making environment, the dissertation demonstrates that the repeated game can be used in enterprise talentcompetition strategic decisions, and according to the principle of repeated game,constructs the repeated game model of enterprise talent competition strategicdecision. Finally, Google’s case is used to illustrate the operability andpracticability of repeated game model of enterprise talent competition strategicdecision. Talent competition in strategic decision-making repeated game model isoperability. Research of this dissertation can provide a scientific basis forenterprise talent competition strategic decision.