| In the trends of economic and technological globalization, technological innovation hasbecome the driving force of sustainable development. But in a competitive market environment,enterprises can’t maintain a sustainable competitive advantage just relying on their own R&Defforts solely. So it is an important channel for enterprises to seek industrial technology allianceplatform to make up for their lack of innovation and enhance firm innovation performance.However, statistics show that the contradiction of alliance caused by inappropriate alliance profitdistribution exacerbated the alliances’ instability, and lead to the shorter existence of industrialtechnology alliance. Many scholars carry out research on this object, but the research contentsmostly focus on the alliance development of operational mechanism, the stability of alliance,overflowing effects of alliance knowledge and alliance performance, less on the alliance profitdistribution which is most concerned by alliance. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the choices ofalliance profit distribution by alliance enterprises. From this hot question, this research applied thetheoretical deduction, modeling, simulation analysis and empirical research to figure out therelationship of interest distribution of industrial technology alliances to innovation performance ofthe enterprise. We also analyze the impact of different allocation on the enterprise innovativeperformance.Firstly, the paper summarizes the related concepts: industrial technology alliance,profit-sharing arrangement, innovation performance, after the literature review, the distribution ofindustrial technology alliances is divided into four parts in the perspective of cooperate technologyallocation: according to the proportion of investment allocation, the actual contribution during thecooperation process, free use of technology companies and share the technology by purchasing. Theenterprise innovation performance is separated into two dimensions: the objective innovation andprocess innovation performance. The objective innovation performance can be illustrated bydeveloping new product, improved new technology and expanding the market share; the innovationperformance process can be measured by gaining more external funding, expanding the inter-firmpartnership networks and gaining more market and technical information.On the basis of the literature review and theoretical analysis, the first analysis of the impact ofdifferent interest distribution path on innovative performance, to study the interaction of eachvariable different feedback loop, then build four industrial technology alliances interest distributionsystems and innovative performance kinetic model and do simulation. Obtain free use of technology companies, in accordance with the actual contribution of the cooperation process allocation,according to the ratio of investment allocation, by way of pay for four distribution companies toshare technology innovation performance impact on the descending conclusions.In the empirical stage, the method of questionnaire is used to collect the information oftechnology innovation strategic alliance of traditional manufacturing industry in ZheJiang provienceand with155valid questionnaires. After verifying the reliability and validity of the datas by SPSS18.0, correlation analysis between profit-sharing arrangements and innovative performance is made.Through verifying the proposed hypothesis, the empirical results indicate that there exists positivecorrelation between members’ innovation performance and the mode of free using technology foralliance enterprises, as well as between the innovation performance and profit-sharing arrangementaccording to member’s actual contribution. The results also suggest that there is a positive impact ofprofit-sharing arrangement according to member’s proportion of investment on member’s objectiveinnovation performance, while that there exists positive correlation between member’s processinnovation performance and the mode of paying for cooperative innovation technology.Based on the above findings, from the view of business participants, alliance managers andgovernment directors, this paper also threw out the related policy recommendations to promote thestable development of the league. In terms of corporate participants, the core companies shouldguide the development and research of common technology industry as a whole, so that choose orbe assigned according to the proportion of investment by way of cooperation during the actualcontribution allocated; and non-core companies should abandon its alliance mental game, provideits own technology and support to achieve the objective of the alliance and choose to pay for waysto share technology or free use of distribution; league manager is to select a different aspect ofdistribution benefits from the cooperation process in three phases, respectively; to governmentdirectors, they should pay attention to the protection of intellectual property rights as well as policysupport, and secondly maintain the coalition negotiations intermediate stable development, finallypropose government-funded program for small business. |
