An Empirical Study On The Influence Of Listing Corporation Executive Pay And Per Formance Related Degree To Accounting Conservatism

In contemporary corporate governance policies among all of the assets of the enterprise ownersand operators to manage the delivery, resulting in agency costs..As owner and operator existsbetween serious information asymmetry, the operator is likely driven by the interests under inflatedassets, false profits, in order to achieve their own ends. This objective is achieved by damagestability criteria to achieve. Such operators to manage earnings, turning a blind eye on the behaviorof accounting conservatism, will make outside investors management situation of enterprises have ahuge misunderstanding, would seriously damage the interests of outside investors. Therefore, inorder to protect business interests from harm and reduce litigation costs, agency costs, shareholdersand stakeholders in the external reporting requirements consistent with the financial statements ofapplying the accounting conservatism principle.This paper is divided into six parts, the first part of the introduction, describes the researchbackground and significance, research status, content and technology roadmap, research methodsand innovation. The second part of the correlation between executive pay and performance theory,from a different point of view on executive compensation on research related theories, and executivepay and performance-related sexual conduct preliminary discussions. The third part elaborated theaccounting conservatism motivation and economic consequences, including the validity of contracts,litigation, tax policy, government regulation and incentives and earnings management, debt contract,information asymmetry, investment efficiency consequences. The fourth part from the shallower tothe deeper, step-by-step analysis of the impact of the relevance between executive compensation andperformance of listing Corporation on the accounting conservatism, related to the degree of theexecutive compensation and corporate performance theoretically more listing Corporation,accounting conservatism worse results. The sixth part is the conclusion, on the base of the analysis,found that in China’s listing Corporation, different industry, different scale, profit ability, robustnesscriteria for application level also has the very big difference conclusion.In this paper, the angle of departure executives incentives and constraints of accounting conservatism study can provide guidance for the development of executive compensation contractsin theory. By influencing the level of executive pay and performance discussions related toaccounting conservatism, and the extent of proposed executive pay and performance-relatedaccounting conservatism, the worse the greater the conclusions provide the basis for enterprises toimprove accounting conservatism.