| Since 1998, our country began a pilot project to introduce the credit guarantee system among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). After that, guarantee institution developed rapidly and play an important role in solving the problem of financing the SMEs. After 20 years’ development, our country have formed a pattern of policy, commercial and mutual guarantee institutions developing altogether, in which private capital played an important role and the ownership structure of the guarantee institutions showed a trend of diversification. However, these various types of guarantee institutions exposed more and more problems in the rapid development, large numbers of guarantee institutions operate inefficiency. Different ownership structures result in the different efficiency by acting on corporate governance. Therefore, from the perspective of ownership structure we study the efficiency of guarantee institutions, which has great significance in optimizing ownership structure and improving the efficiency of guarantee institutions.Firstly, we define the efficiency and equity structure of the guarantee institutions, and then we use the theory of corporate governance, combined with the actual situation of guarantee institutions, analyze the influence mechanism of equity structure to the operating efficiency of guarantee institutions from nature of the shareholders and ownership concentration, and put forward four reasonable hypothesis that need to be further empirically test. And then we use the data of 76 sample guarantee institutions of 2012 in Hangzhou, analyze the impact of ownership structure on operating efficiency of guarantee institutions using empirical analysis method. The empirical research part of this paper is divided into two steps:First, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate the efficiency of guarantee institutions, and do the statistical description analysis; Then, for the hypothesis proposed in the theoretical analysis part, establish Tobit regression model, analyze the impact of ownership structure on operating efficiency of guarantee institutions from nature of the shareholders and ownership concentration.The conclusion of this paper consists of two aspects. In terms of efficiency measurement, we find that the efficiency of guarantee institutions in Hangzhou is low in overall level and showed large individual differences. Divide the samples according to guarantee mode, we find that the efficiency of policy guarantee institutions is the highest, followed by commercial and mutual guarantee institutions. In terms of the impact of ownership structure on the operating efficiency of guarantee institutions, we find that different nature of shareholders impact the operating efficiency on guarantee institutions in a different direction:state shares and state-owned corporate shares as the first major shareholder have a significant positive impact on the operating efficiency and state-owned corporate shares have a greater impact than state shares; The general corporate shares as the first major shareholder have a significant negative impact on the operating efficiency. The ownership concentration of the guarantee institutions in Hangzhou is generally high, and the impact to the operating efficiency was showed as a "U" shaped curve. When the share proportion of the largest shareholder is around 57%, the operating efficiency of guarantee institutions is lowest.Therefore, this paper argues that the state-owned shares should replace the way of state shares in guarantee institutions, and private guarantee institutions should try to attract equity participation of the government, which play the function of guidance and supervision; At the same time, the introduction of risk venture investors can help establish diversified investment main body, making the guarantee agencies to maintain sustainable development. |