Research On The Proportion Of Government Shareholdings And Corporate Performance

Equity property is a main dimension of ownership structure as well as concentration. Because the Chinese stock markets is set for aim to improve the performances of state-owned enterprises, Chinese governments still keep the control position in the structure of those transformed and listed companies. Although the government shareholdings of these listed companies have good impact in the corporate governance mechanism and important resources in their development, as the intervention grow more, the enterprises are in face of the declining performances. The move of Privatization started in the European countries also moves the Chinese state-owned enterprises reform into another high position. Our government decided to reduce the shareholdings, resulting to the reducing devote in the governance and the guidance & support of companies, which lead to a low scores of companies. No doubt that it is important to decide how many shareholdings should the state own and whether the state-owned property rights concentrate or not for the further reforms of state-owned enterprises.Based on the theoretical and empirical analyzing method, this paper adopts a sample of 1576 listed companies from 2009 to 2013 for empirical analysis to find out influence of state-owned shares on corporate performance of listed company. The conclusions are :(l)listed companies controlled by states have superior performances than those controlled by non-states, and the state shareholdings work well.(2) an inverse U-shaped curve demonstrates the relationship between the state-owned shareholdings and corporate performance. Increasing the proportion of state shareholdings will encourage the performance when government holds a little ownership right. But the company will reach an ideal performance level only when the government holds moderate proportion of shares. This paper also offers some suggestions for improving corporate performance, such as:(1) focusing on the “Top Value” when we change the proportion of state-owned shareholdings.(2) establishing an effective outsider supervising environment.(3) concentrating on the values of state shareholdings while regularizing the state-owner behaviors.