Research On The Ownership Structure And Firm Performance About The State-owned Enterprises Reform From The Perspective Of Game Theory

The state-owned enterprise is an organization for the country to provide products and services,and a way to join in the market.The privatization of state-owned enterprise which started in the late of 1970 s sharply reduced the proportion of state-owned enterprise in the real economy scale in Western countries.However,the share of state-owned property in the listed companies all over the world(except the United States)has been ubiquitous and showed a significant growth trend since 21 st century.It has been increasingly diversified in the manifestation of state-owned property right in companies,showed as the generation and development of mixed ownership enterprises with multiple economic sectors interpenetrating and integrating.In the past forty years,the state-owned enterprise reform in China gained remarkable achievement with the reform and opening-up.The social orientation,business form and operation mechanism of state-owned enterprises has been deeply changed.Some major state-owned enterprises have become the backbone of national economy,have shouldered the responsibility of enhancing the nation’s power and competitiveness,and have gradually come to the fore in international competition.The Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era of President Xi Jinping puts forward a series of treatise on the development of state-owned enterprise reforming.The thought indicates that state-owned enterprises are pillars of socialism career,the most reliable strength of the Party and our country,strengthening the overall national strength,promoting the main force of economic development and social progress,and guaranteeing and optimizing livelihood.The target of state-owned enterprises in new era is making themselves greater and more excellent unflinchingly.The thought also emphasize that take mixed ownership as the important breakthrough of state-owned enterprise reform.However,in the practice,the problem of low efficiency in state-owned enterprises is objective.This dissertation tries to find the correlation of state-owned enterprises’ ownership structure and performance based on the multilayered character of ownership structure,so as to look forward to developing and helping to understand the application of the theory of ownership structure in state-owned enterprises,estimates the state-owned system and evolution process of state-owned enterprise correctly and scientifically,clarifies the relationship of the national and the private in the enterprise level,and tries to explore the direction and method of prospective state-owned enterprise reform.The paper first puts forward the concept of ownership,ownership structure of enterprises and actual controller.Secondly,it concludes related literature,mainly including literature review on the correlation between equity concentration,equity subject structure(management shareholding,institutional shareholding,national shareholding and actual controller shareholding)and enterprise performance.In sum,the literature hardly found that there was explicit and oriented relationship between the enterprise performance and ownership structure indicators except the institutional shareholding.Using the principal-agent theory,property rights theory,and transaction cost theory,based on the classic game model,this part analyzes how enterprise performance changes with the change of ownership structure under three major situations.The first situation is the rights separation between ownership and management right.The second is the unbalanced modern enterprise ownership structure.And the last situation is the government acting an agent in senior principal-agent chain involve in the junior of principal-agent chain in state-owned enterprises,acting as a principal.Especially in the third situation,this chapter attempts to describe the indirect influence on enterprise performance after great decisions affected directly by multi-player game.Before conducting the empirical study,a large file of historical documents has been analyzing.Using historical analysis,comparative analysis and case analysis,this part first investigates the evolution process of state-owned enterprise ownership structure in the world by mainly choosing reform subjects in the tide of the privatization from 1970 s,including the developed economies such as the United Kingdom,the United States,France,Germany and Italy,and transitional economies like eastern Europe,Russia,Brazil and Argentina.Then this part also considers the situation of state-owned enterprise reforming in China since the reform and opening-up started,collates the policy trends and developments of a new round state-owned enterprises reforming in China,investigates the performance of state-owned enterprises since the day of systematic data published,evaluates and analyzes various state-owned enterprises through organization form,enterprise scale,employment status,profitability,debt-paying ability and growth ability,and distinguishes the different subordinate levels of state-owned enterprises.In consider of actual controllers can draw a significant impact on the operating performance of enterprises in the ownership chain structure,the article researches the evolution of the actual controllers of enterprises in China(state-owned companies stand half of A-listed ones).This part further constructs a GMM econometric model to investigate the quantitative relationship between the enterprise ownership structure(including equity concentration,equity subject structure)and the enterprise performance,and conducts classified regression according to industry,company and actual controller attributes.The empirical research indicates that there is a U-shape relationship between equity concentration index,equity subject indicators of Chinese listed companies and enterprise performance.In another word,there is no "optimal solution" for the equity structure research of listed companies.Thus,highly dispersed or highly concentrated ownership structure may be more conducive to enterprise performance improvement.From the perspective of industry,the statistical performance of competitive industries represented by electronics,food and beverage and trade is more significant.From the perspective of company attribute,the statistical performance of foreign investment enterprises and central holding enterprises is more significant.From the perspective of actual controller,the statistical performance of enterprises of the actual controllers with "state-owned" attribute and enterprises with the joint actual controllers is more significant.In the end,based on the above all analysis results,four policy recommendations are put forward.This dissertation has innovation and deficiencies.The innovation of this dissertation mainly focuses on empirical research.Firstly,it comprehensively examines the relationship between ownership structure and enterprise performance from a more subdivided level and considers industry classification and administrative subordination level classification.Secondly,the shareholding ratio of the actual controller is increased into the variables of the equity subject structure,and the social benefit variable such as the enterprise tax index is increased into the variables of enterprise performance.Finally,GMM method is adopted as the application of econometric model,instead of the traditional OLS and 2SLS methods.The deficiencies of this dissertation include,first,the selected indicators to describe enterprise social benefit have certain limitations;second,due to the availability of data,the empirical analysis is only conducted on listed companies,and the samples fail to cover all state-owned enterprises.