Quantity Flexible Contract-based Two-echelon Supply Chain Information Leakage And Its Governance Research

The bullwhip effect reduces operations efficiency and weakens the overall competitiveness of the supply chain. It will eventually result in a waste of social resources. However, supply chain information sharing can solve these problems. But, once the shared information is leaked, the supply chain members’ cooperation will meet disruption, thereby affecting the stability of the supply chain. Therefore, making in-depth study of supply chain information leakage and proposing appropriate control measures have important theoretical significance and application value.For in-depth analysis of the supply chain information leakage problem, the comprehensive use of game theory, agency theory, probability theory, literature survey, supply chain contracts and other methods are adopted.Firstly, the concept of supply chain information leakage is introduced. Then according to the owners of the information whether they intend or not to leak, the information leakage of supply chain is divided into the non-policy information leakage and policy information leakage categories. Following are the detailed introduction of the 3 channels of leaking information. Further it analyzes the supply chain members’ game equilibrium type in leakage. These studies provide theoretical basis for the following chapters.Secondly, a two-tier supply chain is established which is composed of one supplier and two retailers who are competing on quantities. The retailers’ order quantities are analyzed under non-leakage and leakage cases based on the quantity flexible contract. The supplier’s information decisions in high and low market demand are studied. And on the basis of that, the mechanism of supplier’s strategy information disclosure and information leak conditions are found in the quantity flexibility contract.Thirdly, the retailers’ signal game models of order decision are established under the conditions of information leakage. Two Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria:PBNE--separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are created. The retailers’ optimal order strategy and faith in two equilibriums are obtained, and the condition of existence of the two equilibriums is also identified.Finally, it incorporates the incentive theory into doing the decision-making of the leader and the supplier, and thus finding the conditions and nonleakage interval. And then, the leader’s ordering policies are given under the level of high and low market demand according to the characteristics of quantity flexible contract.The quantity flexible contract is incorporated into governing the supply chain information leakage issue, thus providing a new feasible method for supply chain management of information leakage.