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Patent Pledge Loan And Investment Analysis Of The Small And Medium-sized Innovation Enterprises

Posted on:2012-12-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330392458055Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Small and medium-sized innovation enterprises’ difficulty to finance is a hot problemthat finance theory and industry concentrate on, aimed at small and medium-sizedinnovation enterprises’ finance, this paper gives an analysis of patent pledged loan andinvestment under adverse selection, not only makes the patent pledge financing feasible,but also enables banks to evade the risk effectively, has important theory and realisticmeaning.The small and medium-sized innovation enterprises often can’t get loan when borrowmoney from bank, because the lack of fixed assets used as collateral, such as house, land,equipment and so on. But they have patent technology, so using patent as collateral is thebreach to finance, it breaks the traditional way of using assets as collateral to finance, andprovide a new financing way to the enterprises. Our country has paid much attention to it.Twelve cities have found patent pledge financing pilots, such as Haidian District, Wuxi,Wenzhou and so on. But there is still a lack of theory research of this new way. This papergives an analysis of patent collateral and investment under adverse selection, using thetheory of equilibrium game in information economics, gets the following results: first,separating equilibrium, in which investment and good enterprise’s profit are increasing inthe patent value, are more likely to arise when patent value is relatively high; second,pooling equilibrium, in which investment is independent of patent value and theenterprise’s profit is increasing in the patent value, are more likely to arise when patentvalue is relatively low; and third, there is an induce from pooling equilibrium to separatingequilibrium as the patent value increases, a fall in investment will happen in theinducement. Using the analysis of this paper, the bank can provide the optimal loancontract to enterprises, separating equilibrium contract or pooling equilibrium contract.Banks then avoid credit risk successfully with the insurance of the loan.
Keywords/Search Tags:Adverse selection, Patent collateral, Investment, Separating equilibrium, Pooling equilibrium
PDF Full Text Request
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