The Institutional Cause And Countermeasure Of China’ Stock Market Non-equilibrium Development

Over the years, the scale of China’s stock market is gradually expanding, but the corresponding quality has not been improved, mainly reflected in the departure from the stock market to the real economy for a long time. Stock market dysfunction, systemic risks rise, inadequate protection for the interests of investors and other problems also increasingly attract people’s concern. In the view of this phenomenon, we have to think:what exactly is the problem with China’s stock market in its development process. Based on reading a lot of relevant literature, this paper finds that China’s stock market has the following non-equilibrium problems in its development process:(1) The disequilibrium of government intervention, namely the disequilibrium of "promote financing, neglect investment; focus on the development, evade responsibility; Share the benefits, shuffle the consequences", that appears during china’s government regulation of the stock market. (2) The disequilibrium of stock market function, such as financing, adjusting surplus and deficiency, risk diversification, investment etc. (3) The disequilibrium between benefits and costs of institutional innovation, that the new institutional innovation is blocked as a result of the expected return is less than the costs and the resistance of institutional innovation is too large. (4) The disequilibrium of profit distribution of stock market participants, that expressed in a large gap of profit distribution between ordinary investors and the government, the listed company and Intermediary institutions.From the national forging ahead will and strategy perspective, this paper is to explore the generation and evolution of government action in China’s stock market development process. Using "grabbing hand" model of the state theory, the interest group theory, "rent-seeking hand" model, predatory institution and other analysis methods, when studying the cause of China’ stock market non-equilibrium development. The article discusses that the national forging ahead will is a kind of preference or tend basis on catching up with advanced ones and catching up from behind, which determines the content of forging ahead strategy, its essence is to mobilize the financing resources effectively and get capital support quickly. Therefore, China’s stock market formed the target location in which the financing dominates. The grabbing hand would ensue when the government power used excessively (namely the government controls more market resources, regulates more items, and the frequency of the intervention is too high) and lacked in effective constraint in the process of the pursuit of target profit maximization. This hand tends to protect financiers’ interests and plunder the wealth of the majority of ordinary investors in the stock market. Government regulation and intervention rights created opportunities and conditions for the interest group to capture government officials, such as "rent-seeking hand" of the listed companies (especially the state-owned enterprises and their holding companies) move toward the government and officials for getting profit initiatively. The government and interest group mutually exchange the utility function, the interest group obtains entry regulation and market price and internal information by rent-seeking, government officials charge the appropriate rent and lead more resources, then the institutional structure of the predatory color relatively strong produced at this time.Finally, according to the institutional cause of non-equilibrium development, some countermeasures are put forward in order to provide some help for the benign development of the stock market, such as changing concept effectively, establishing the constraint、incentive and Mutual sharing mechanism. We also look forward to these countermeasures could be an important material for the better integration of state theory China’s economic and social practice.