The Research On Supply Chain Performance Under Random Yield

Matching the supply and demand is the core problem of supply chain management,as with the rapid of social and economic development, information technology and resources to accelerate the process of globalization,the characteristic of the supply chain’s uncertainty is characteristic prominent.Uncertainty is a major issue in the research of supply chain management.Most existing researches primary focuses on demand uncertainty,but not concerns the yield uncertainty.However,in practice,many industries such as agriculture,the semiconductor industry, pharmaceutical industry.etc would appear uncertainty of yield.Random yield affects supply chain decision and the main parties of the supply chain members performance.It’s a very meaningful work to design an effective coordination mechanism to improve the performance of supply chain and allocate the risk of random yield reasonablely.In this paper,we consider a two-stage supply chain system including a supplier and a retailer with the random yield,and how to design an effective contract to coordinate the interests of sharing and risk-sharing between supply chain members.The main contents are as follows:(1) Consider supply chain coordination under random yield. First,we described the problem of random yield. Second we constructed the model of centralized system and distributed system and proved under the decentralized system,supply chain can not be achieved coordination. Then retailer design three kinds of incentive contract, including over-production of risk-sharing contract,cost-sharing contract and penalty contract,and proved that the three contracts can achieve supply chain perfect coordination.The supplier and retailer can distribute profits arbitrary. when the parameters of over-production risk sharing contract and cost-sharing contract meet certain conditions,which can substitutes for each other. Finally a numerical example was provided to verify the conclusion.(2)Considering supplier efforts level, supply chain coordinate research with random yield. This part is an extension of the previous section, taking into the effect of human behavior on yield, which is closer to reality. In the case of considering supplier’s effort,we establish a centralized decision-making model including effort factors and decentralized decision making model.which prove that in the decentralized system supply chain coordination can not be achieved. And then design the over-production risk sharing contract and backorder penalty contract, the research proved that over-production production risk sharing contract can not coordinate the supply chain, the level of effort under this contract can not achieve the system optimum efforts level; the backorder penalty contract can achieve supply chain perfect coordination and distribute the supplier and the retailer profits arbitrary.