Consumers’ Channel Choice And Pricing Strategy Of Dual-channel Supply Chains

With the rapid development of Internet, china’s internet users continue to increase. More and more enterprises open an online channel to attract consumers, and thus more and more consumers would consider to shop from different channels. Some consumers prefer to shop from traditional channel because they want to experience products’quality in person. Some consumers prefer to buy products from online channel because they care more about the efficiency of shopping, and do not like spend much time in shopping. Which factor can affect consumer’s channel choice? Study consumers’channel choice has profound meanings, for example, it can provide promoting decision support for enterprises. In recent years, more and more enterprises open an online channel because they note that the online channel can ensure the efficiency of shopping. Enterprises should not only find the factors that can influence consumers’channel choice, but also implement efficient pricing strategies to improve their benefits under the dual-channel environment Consistent pricing strategy and Inconsistent pricing strategy are two totally different pricing strategies. Which pricing strategy is more beneficial to enterprises? The author will study consumers’channel choice behavior and pricing strategies of dual-channel supply chain. When studying the pricing strategies of dual-channel supply chain, the author also considers other factors, such as services and inventories. In Chapters 1 and 2, the author analyzes the background of the research and progress of present researches.In Chapters 3, the author studies consumers’ channel choice for electronic products. Fishbein’s Model and Technology Acceptance Model were widely used because these two models have strong explanatory power for behavioral intention. Combining Fishbein’s Model and Technology Acceptance Model with two added factors (perceived risk and internet experience), the author develops a structural equation model to study consumers’ channel choice. In this research, the author takes smart phone which was very popular among young consumers as a case, using data from questionnaires to investigate the relationships from basic assumptions. The author finds that (ⅰ) both the attitude toward purchasing smart phone via the Internet and the subjective norms of purchasing smart phone via the Internet are positively related to the intention of online channel directly, and negatively related to the intention of offline channel directly.(ⅱ) Subjective norms of purchasing smart phone via the Internet can also be positively related to the intention of online channel indirectly through the attitude toward purchasing smart phone via the Internet, and negatively related to the intention of offline channel indirectly through the attitude toward purchasing smart phone via the Internet. (ⅲ) Perceived risk is negatively related to the attitude toward purchasing smart phone via the Internet and the subjective norms of purchasing smart phone via the Internet. Do these conclusions have differences between different groups? The author divides the respondents into male group and female group. Using the same methods to analyze the whole group, the author gets some useful conclusions.In Chapter 4, the author studies the pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one dual-channel retailer. The author studies two different game orders (providing service first and providing service last) and two different pricing strategies (consistent pricing strategy and inconsistent pricing strategy). Using numerical examples, the author finds that the retailer and the manufacturer in the second game order (providing service last) can get more profit than that in the first game order (providing service first).In Chapter 5, the author studies the pricing strategy of the manufacturer’s dual-channel supply chain combing other two factors:service and inventory. The manufacturer sells products through a direct channel and a retailer. The equilibrium results are given by using Stackelberg game. Using numerical examples, the author analyzes the relationship between the equilibrium results and some important parameters. The author also analyzes the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s profits in two different cases:the retailer provides service and the retailer does not provide service. The author gives the condition where the retailer would like to provide services by comparing profits of two different cases.In Chapter 6, the author studies the pricing strategy of a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer sells products through a direct channel and the retailer. The retailer sells products through the traditional channel (entity shops, also can be called retail channel) and an online channel. Using numerical examples to analyze the relationship between the profits and important parameters, such as the operational cost, the author gives the condition where the retailer and the manufacturer open an online channel.In Chapter 7, the author summarizes conclusions and gives further research directions.