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Research On Rent-seeking In The Allocation Of Affordable Housing

Posted on:2015-02-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M L ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330452956438Subject:Social security
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a policy with a strong color of people’s livelihood, affordable housing system is awelfare policy to solve the housing difficulties of mid-low-income families. However,many rent-seeking behaviors in allocation makes speculators take the occasion to makebig money, while the mid-low-income class desires a house but none. In recent years,affordable housing policy has been the focus of government work. The next few years willbe the peak of affordable housing allocation. Therefore, how to curb the rent-seeking ofaffordable housing allocation, and ensure distribute more fairly are the primary task infront of us. This paper analyzes behavioral choices of rent-seekers, rent-creators andsupervisors with economics and game theory, and reveals the reasons for rent-seekingbehavior in the affordable housing allocation,then makes several suggestsThis study suggests that rent-seekers’ purpose is to sale or rent affordable housing forprofit, their behavior depend on expected benefits and expected cost. The expectedbenefits, bribes, opportunity cost, probability of punishment and intensity of punishmentaffect their behavior. The reasons for rent-seeking of affordable housing allocationincludes: the defect of access mechanism, rent-seeking easy and the small cost, affordablehousing profitable, lenient supervision and penalties. Rent-creators are who master thepowers of affordable housing allocation, their behavior influenced by punishment,probability of punishment, rent and so on. Reasons for the rent-setting of affordablehousing allocation are: loopholes in the system, lenient supervision and penalty,hypothesis of economic man and agency by agreement failure. Supervisor is the outsidesubject of rent-seeking of affordable housing allocation. Rent-seeking of affordablehousing allocation have a great relationship with supervisor. Supervision costs, quality ofinspection, penalty coefficient, officials’ wages and rent-seeking gains influence thebehavior of supervisor.According to the results of the analysis, author proposes relying on system design,punishment strength, investigate probability, rent-seeking benefits and opportunity costs tocurb rent-seeking of affordable housing allocation. First, improve the system designmaking people can’t rent-seeking; Second, strictly control affordable housing traded,weakening its investment function, while improve wages, making people unwilling torent-seeking; third, strengthen supervision and constraints mechanism, strengthen social supervision, increase the punishment, making people not dare to rent-seeking. Only inthis way can we effectively curb the rent-seeking behavior in affordable housingallocation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Affordable Housing, Allocation, Rent-Seekers, Rent-Creators, TripartiteGame
PDF Full Text Request
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