A Study On Dynamic Game Of Mortgage Loan On Rural Property Right

As a large agricultural country, China has low agricultural productivity. Compared withthe average per capita net income of rural family, the number of disposable income of urbanfamily is treble of the number above in the past11years. Urban-rural binary differencebecomes more and more seriously, the need to develop the rural economy and increase theincome of farmer is imminent. Limited to reasonable mortgage, and no suitable guarantor,farmers are very difficult to obtain loan from rural credit union. Farmer loan problembecomes the key factor which restricted the development of rural economy and increasing offarmer income and rural social stability. In recent years, rural property mortgage loan isconsidered to be the solution of farmer loan problem and insufficient of rural fund. It isimportant to research the relationship among farmer, credit union and government.In the process of rural property mortgage loan, the relationship among farmer, creditunion and government is so complex and subtle. Overall, the relationship between the threecan be summarized into two aspects: Firstly, the three aspects benefit each other by ruralproperty mortgage. Secondly, there are many conflicts in the system. Based on the obviousrelationship among them, using the game theory to study this question has an advantage.The research of scholars at home and abroad foregone mostly focused on the followingthree aspects: the relationship between farmer and credit union; the relationship betweencredit union and government; the relationship between farmer and government. The researchforegone mostly focused on game analysis and static analysis between each other. Theresearch above ignored the influence between all parties in the game.This paper focuses on the following three aspects: Firstly, the attitude of the credit unionto farmer’s loan application with or without credit union’s censorship. Secondly, the attitudeof government and credit union to rural property mortgage with or without the government’scensorship. Thirdly, after setting up a game of three partners included farmer, credit union andgovernment we find Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies.Finally, we put forward the following suggestions. Establish an effective censorship bycredit union. Only if the credit union improves the accuracy of farmer credit’s judgment, moremoney will be put into rural area. Government should scientifically establish compensationmechanism on credit union, namely the tax policy and effective supervision mechanism tomake sure that farmer benefit from the property mortgage. Government should strengthen the supervision of the rural financial market and punish the farmers who don’t pay off the loan ontime and the credit unions which cheat of the subsidy from government. To create and developa harmonious rural credit environment, we must strengthen the cooperation between theagricultural credit and the agricultural insurance.