The Game Analysis Of Regional Marine Fisheries Cooperation

In recent years, with the development of the world economy, science andtechnology, national fishing capacity is growing, and the world’s fisheriesdevelop quickly. But due to the marine fisheries resources’ public attributes,Countries always ignore its regenerative capacity when they use it, resulting ina terrible fact that catches is greater than the regenerative capacity, so causethe decline of fishery resources. In addition, the process of regional economicintegration and globalization accelerates. Inter-state relations become moreinterdependence, interdependence and mutual recognition. However, nationalmarine fisheries disputes also increase. In this background, marine fisheriescooperation is an important measure to manage and conserve the marinefisheries resources, to strengthen economic integration, and to solve thefisheries dispute.This paper takes the brief overview of China and the world’s marinefisheries resources and the overview of the marine fisheries cooperation anddisputes between China and other countries as an entry point, and emphasizethe scarcity and the sustainable development of marine fishery resources, thensystematically analyze the interests that the participating country obtain whencountries adopt different strategies in the one-time and permanent game todetermine the optimal strategy under different circumstances in the short andlong term, and to demonstrated the necessity of marine fisheries cooperation.Assume that the cost to reach a cooperation agreement is zero, and thecompetitive cost appears only when the sum of the catches is larger than thetotal amount of marine fishery resources in the region. The result of the Gameanalysis show that in the one-time game the sum of the best catches thatcountries determine is less than the total amount of marine fishery resourcesdue to technical and other limitation, cooperation or not does not affect the interests in this condition. With the development of technology, the bestcatches will continue to increase, on the other hand, the total amount offishery resources in the region can not increase, so the sum of the catches willbe larger than the total marine fishery resources eventually. The sum of thecatches that is determined by the final strategy will be larger than themaximum catches that sustainable fisheries allow in any situations, and causethe decline of fishery resources. In the permanent game, future benefitsdecline because of the degradation of fishery resources that result from theoverfishing in short-term. So countries obtain little benefit in the long-termwhen countries take uncooperative strategy, and cooperation is the dominantstrategy. Countries will keep the sum of the catches within the maximumamount to gain larger long-term profit.According to the level of being restricted and the protection effects onfishery in the actual process of regional marine fisheries cooperation, themarine fisheries cooperation model can be divided into six types includingloose, semi-loose, transnational freedom fishery zone, transitional type,joint-stock company and UN agency management. The degree of politicaltrust and the comparison of marine fisheries strength are the important factorsthat affect the choice of the marine fisheries cooperation model. And fromfour aspects that include fisheries support, fishery inputs, outputs, promotingthe economic development, to build the indicator system to assess marinefisheries strength. Principal component analysis result shows that marinefisheries strength of China increases in recent years, and if marine fisheriesstrength of other countries didn’t change, so the relative marine fisheriesstrength of China would continue to enhance, China also would be moreinclined to free mode--transnational freedom fishery zone in the choose of themarine fisheries cooperation model.In summary, the countries should adhere to the principles of sustainabledevelopment, constantly approached marine fisheries laws and industrystandards, establish a unified fisheries management agency and the corresponding dispute resolution mechanisms to promote marine fisheriescooperation to manage and conserve the marine fisheries resources.