Research On The Effects Of Ultimate Controller Of China’s Listing Corporation To The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The stock market essentially is an information market, investors make investment decision which according to the disclosure of information from the listing corporation. Undoubtedly, full disclosure of information will promote the effective allocation of resources of the securities market. There are many factors that will impact on the quality of information disclosure, such as ownership structure, board structure and so on. This paper studies the effect of ownership structure on the quality of information disclosure. The current studies show that, the equity structure of the listing corporation in the world is not widely dispersed, but the relative concentration (Shleifer and Vishny,1986). When the dispersed ownership, agency problem is mainly concentrated in between principal and agent, and when the concentration of ownership, the agency problem mainly concentrated in the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders. The ownership of Chinese listing corporation is generally concentrated, almost every company has ultimate controller of their own, so this paper mainly studies the ultimate controller of the impact on the quality of information disclosure.The thesis mainly launches from the following aspects:Firstly, this paper reviews and analyses the related home and abroad previous work on the quality of disclosure and the ultimate controlling shareholder, through literature review, understanding the history, research status and the focus of debate on research, in order to find the existing problems in the current studies and find a new direction for the study of this paper.Secondly, to define the concept of the ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure, the definition of the ultimate controller is used by La Porta et al, starting from the back of the listing corporation control chain to the top, namely the listing corporation’s ultimate controller. The qualitative criteria on the quality of information disclosure is timeliness, accuracy, authenticity and integrity, we review the domestic and foreign scholars’a variety of the quantitative standard on the quality of information disclosure, this paper select the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information disclosure evaluation results as the information disclosure quality proxy. The related theories on ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure are retrospectively reviewed and analyzed.Thirdly, on the basis of the above, this paper choose Chinese company listed on the main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, take an empirical test that the ultimate controller influence on the quality of information disclosure. The results show that:the ultimate controller’s extent of excess control have a negative impact on the information disclosure quality; pyramid level impact on the quality of information disclosure, we find that when the listing corporation in pyramid structure more bottom, namely pyramid hierarchy is higher, the quality of information disclosure is low; Compared with the ultimate controller is state-owned listing corporation, private listing corporation’s information disclosure is poor; When the ultimate controller served as listing corporation’s chairman or general manager, the administrative power have negative affect on information disclosure.Finally, combining the research results of this paper, we put forward some suggestions:strengthen the supervision of information disclosure mechanism of private listing companies; improving information disclosure system of the controlling shareholder; establishing an evaluation of information disclosure which is suitable for the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Considering the limitations of this study and further research directions are given.