Font Size: a A A

Research On The Impact Of Pyramid Ownership Structure On The Quality Of Information Disclosure Of Listed Companies

Posted on:2021-02-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330602480853Subject:Financial
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The company's operation and management process is not static,but it is constantly changing due to fluctuations in the market environment and the company's own strength,and its shareholding structure has been adjusted accordingly.my country's listed companies have a higher degree of recognition and acceptance of the pyramid shareholding structure,but the second type of principal-agent problems caused by the ultimate controlling shareholders and small and medium shareholders will directly affect the information disclosure behavior of listed companies.At the same time,when the company is in different life cycles,due to the different goals it pursues,the characteristics of the pyramid shareholding structure have different effects on the company's information disclosure behavior.The article traces the control chain of the pyramidal shareholding structure to the ultimate controlling shareholder,taking the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights,control rights and separation of the two as the entry points,and combining corporate life cycle theory,principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory respectively Analyze the incentive effect and trench effect of different life cycles on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.At the same time,the cash flow combination method was used to divide the listed companies that adopted the pyramid shareholding structure in the Shenzhen Stock A Main Board from 2011 to 2018 into three stages:long-term,mature period and recession period.On the other hand,on the basis of the existing research,combined with the current background of China's listed company information disclosure system,the information disclosure evaluation results published by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are used to measure the quality of listed company information disclosure,and then an orderly logistic regression model is constructed to further explore the full sample and The heterogeneous impact of the pyramidal shareholding structure of each life cycle on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,and the robustness of the research results is confirmed by the Logit regression model.The study found that:(1)The ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights and control rights both positively affect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,but the degree of separation of the two powers is the opposite;(2)The quality of information disclosure of mature listed companies is influenced by the ultimate controlling shareholder The impact of the separation of powers is more significant,while cash flow rights and control rights have a greater impact on the quality of company information disclosure in the growth and recession periodsIn China's capital market,investors and other stakeholders mainly obtain information on the operation and management of listed companies through information disclosure.High-quality information disclosure can help eliminate information asymmetry in the capital market and help investors make investment decisions.It is of great significance to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China's capital market.Regulatory departments and listed companies have an inescapable obligation to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in my country.The regulatory department should improve the information disclosure system of listed companies in accordance with the life cycle of the company,and focus on monitoring some companies,increase the administrative penalties for companies with violations of information disclosure,and improve the information disclosure evaluation system;listed companies should also The actual development situation is to optimize the pyramid shareholding structure in terms of improving the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights,the proportion of control rights,and controlling the separation of the two powers,so as to improve its internal supervision and governance system,and by introducing institutional investors and moderately expanding the size of the board of directors.The root cause improves the quality of its information disclosure.
Keywords/Search Tags:Pyramid shareholding structure, Information disclosure quality, Business life cycle, Incentive effect, Entrenchment effect
PDF Full Text Request
Related items