The Dynamic Game Studies On The Process Of The Finance Matched Transfer Payment

Finance Matched Transfer payment is the Chinese central government to thelocal current fiscal transfer payment system, a high proportion of transfer paymentforms,an important policy tool for solve the problem of public service and financialimbalances.Since China’s current tax system and the central and local fiscal transferpayment system is not perfect, so in the course of the financial support of thetransfer payments, the central government and local governments due to differencesin the objective function, the presence of the dynamic behavior of cooperative game.In the game, the central finance system based on inertia and the status quo, thenational public goods supply and guide local public issues for the basic logic ofgovernance, financial support to local governments to finance matched transferpayment. And local officials based on insufficient financial resources, promotionand game logic of long-term interests, trying to get the finance matched transferpayment of central.Analyze a point of the game process，The Central governmentuse transfer payment policies and regulations, funding matching funds shift to anearlier date, strong monitoring and management. As strategy to improve theenthusiasm of financial resources of local government. Local governments use debt,idling, false declarations and other strategies to raise matching funds to get thecentral fiscal matched transfer payment to make up the local fiscal gap.Game of fiscal matched transfer payment processes enhance the level of publicgoods supply to some extent. disrupt the local autonomy in fiscal expenditure, alsoproduced some corruption. Also led to the substitution effect of financial resources,resulting in a fiscal lateral imbalance, disrupting local autonomy in fiscalexpenditure, but also caused some corruption. In addition, led to some corruption.