Game Theory Based Privacy Policy And Service Selection

Out of business purpose, many service-providers tend to ask users to trade their privacy for free service, while users are confronted with the potential threat of privacy disclosure, and then a contradictory supply-demand relation takes shape. If providers need too much privacy, users will abandon the service. On the contrary, users can not get access to the service when they care too much about their privacy. Therefore, the issue of keeping privacy and service balanced by gaming theory to maximize the benefit of every participant is of great practical significance and value. In reality, there are problems such as limited server resource, customized privacy for users and the interplay under multi to multi situation and so on. Existing work focuses on some parts of the listed problems. Synthesizing the given requirements, this article introduces different model for privacy and service selection under circumstances such as single/multiple service provider, single/multiple user, single/sequence game, and then analyzes the best choices under such constrains.First of all, aiming at customized privacy protection requirement for clients, we introduce quantifiable calculation for privacy preference, and then define the value of privacy data combining with the need of excavation and aim of service-providers using privacy data. Taking the objective conditions of service providers into account, we can express that in the dimension of limited privacy and serving policy, and the constrains of user capacity and service quality.In terms of single service provider, we suggest that using the privacy and service selection model for a single client, based on sequential gaming theory. By analyzing the Nash-Equilibrium of first round gaming and its coming sub-gaming, then we provide clients with the exact guideline to choose between privacy and service. And when multiple clients are introduced, we bring up the privacy and service selection model with a single service provider for multiple clients and analyze the time complexity of this issue. Finally, we conducting empirical research about user privacy preference and privacy awareness, setting the value of privacy and its preference, relevant data is simulated and experimental verification shows privacy value directly affects the business strategy and indirectly affects the user benefit; When the privacy information holds invariant, the increase of service content will increase the user benefit, which is a direct impact on the user policy and indirectly affects the business strategy; besides, the improvement of service quality leads to the increase of user benefit and the decrease of business income, directly affecting users and business strategy selection. In privacy and service selection model for multi-user, we discuss the effects on the business income and the number of customer service with three kinds of distribution of user privacy preference under different supply-demand relationships, which means user group privacy preference obeys Gaussian distribution, the majority of users pay a little attention on privacy information and the majority of users pay too much attention on privacy information.Under the condition of limited service resources, we have put forward multi-providers based privacy and service game selection model. The selection problems of privacy and service is imputed to the problem of maximize benefits under multi-constraint conditions. We have analyzed the time complexity of the question and solved it by the linear programming method. For the reality of resource constraints, we have proposed the model of maximized amount of users who have got service, as well as the maximize benefits of users and providers model, which can be solved by Looking for maximum flow and finding out the maximized matching of the bisected graph. This experiment analysis the influence of the users’privacy preference to the matching users:if user privacy preferences obey normal distribution, with the increase of needs of business privacy, the matching proportion of users will decreases and the amount of users to access services will reduce; if the majority of users pay a little attention to the information privacy, it will obtain the largest number of users who enjoy merchant service. Merchant services in short supply significantly limits the amount of users to access services; if the majority of users pay too much attention to privacy information, the relationship between merchants and users of demand and supply will not affect the matching strategy, thus there’s no impact on the number of users obtaining merchant services.