The Study Of Local Government’s Capture Behavior In The Progress Of The Rural Community Construction

The local government as executor of policy-regulation of rural community has the most direct power for planning and construction of the rural community.However, the local government exists self-interesting characteristics.Therefore,it is easy to generate the phenomenon of deviation regulation capture behavior, to capture the government upward and to capture the local community during execution of policy-regulation of rural communities.In this paper, the so-called capture behavior of the local government is different from the capture of government concept in the Economics Regulation Theory.It does not refer to enterprises through affecting the governments’public policy formulation and capturing the public welfare behavior.It doesn’t refer to capturing the market and enterprises for the government. The capture behavior of local government is that local government uses institutional and policy regulation of country to rural community to capture resources of regulation and countryside in the process of execution and operation. Through observing the process of industrial park construction in typical pilots of rural communities in western undeveloped regions,this research captures the computing and seizing phenomenon of resources of regulation and countryside as local government provides economic support and service supply to rural community, and explain the relationship between the capture behavior of local government and the institutional environment, which thinks it is the contradiction between the executive power of the government highly centralized decision-making power and separation, and the unexpected effect generated by the incentive mechanism to strengthen, and further the inevitable result of the "pressurized system" in the fiscal pressure of the tax and fee period.That is to say, the tendency of different levels of government regulation of differentiation for the capture behavior of the local government provides the foundation of the system and selective incentive mechanism of resources put focus on the internal driving force and the financial pressure on the post tax era further stimulates the impulse. In addition, the research also found two trends under the effect of the capture behavior of local government on rural communities—dual development pattern of village in rural communities and policy of local government captured by village; no matter which kind of trends, does not conform to the objectives and intentions of current development of rural community and national regulation in China.