International Anti-terrorism Reciprocity Cooperation Model

Since the 1990s, terrorism has breed and spread rapidly on a global scale. This not only cause serious damage to life and property safety of people and constitutes the great threat for the peace, security and order of the society. The advent of this trend makes international terrorism to become a major challenge facing all countries in the world, and a profound impact on the evolution of international relations and world politics since the new century.Since the terrorist attacks on September 11,2001, how to efficiently prevent, control and suppress international terrorism has been becoming the focus shared by officials, scholars, and even common people. At the same time, a large number of research literature on terrorism emerged. However, given the hundreds of different scholars’definition of "terrorism" which included the political and emotional meaning, there is a big controversy. The United Nations has attempted to define terrorism, but there is disagreement on the status of member of national liberation and national self-determination conflicts arising from the use of violence. The United Nations can not make the "the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism" including a single, comprehensive, legally binding definition of terrorism.Although the definition of terrorism is still not clear which increase the difficulty of counter-terrorism cooperation, so the US-led developed countries have double standards in the fight against terrorism. In fact, with the spread of terrorism in the international community, rely on some countries to strengthen efforts to combat terrorism within the native range; it is not sufficient to prevent the international spread of terrorism in the world. So call on States to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation to meet the challenges of terrorism threats.Although many countries recognize the importance of counter-terrorism cooperation at the present, the distribution of benefits and the double standard of terrorism taken by the US-led developed countries have seriously hindered the process of cooperation against terrorism. Therefore, anti-terrorism cooperation aroused great concern of national governments.In order to build the international reciprocity anti-terrorism cooperation model, In this paper, infectious diseases SIR model and star model simulate respectively the international spread dynamic and network of terrorism. We can get a clear probability of terrorist attacks in a single country. And then discusses how to re-integrate global economic interests allocation problem, as well as how to effectively control double standards or the free rider phenomenon. Thus further expanding the depth and breadth of international cooperation against terrorism.The specific research works of this paper include the following aspects:Firstly, for the international dimension of terrorism, the paper uses evolutionary game theory replicator dynamics equation to establish epidemic SIR model to describe the spread of international terrorism in the world. On this basis, we derive the expression of the proportion of the terrorism under the star model assumption. The results showed that initial country 0 occupies a crucial position in the international propagation of terrorism. Increasing the country 0 intensity of the fight against terrorists is conducive to prevent the spread of international terrorism worldwide. Then we solve respectively selfish game considering maximizing individual national interests and system optimum game considering maximizing the whole economic system benefits. The results showed that initial country 0 anti-terrorism strength is obviously inadequate. Cooperation contract helps to ahieve system suboptimal solution.Secondly, cnsidering the strategy reciprocal relationship and psychological utility, the paper builds the sequential reciprocal game model about the double standard problem in the international anti-terrorism cooperation. We analyze the trade-off between the long reciprocal relationship of anti-terrorism cooperation and the unilateral income derived from the double standard or free rider, and then discuss the major reasons of failure in international anti-terrorism cooperation. The results show that the main influences include the reciprocal sensitive coefficient, the unilateral income, and the cost of anti-terrorism cooperation. It helps to reach the international anti-terrorism cooperation that improving cooperative income, reducing the cooperative cost and unilateral income derived from double standard and free rider behavior.The main innovation points of the paper are as follows:(1) Based on SIR epidemic model in the star-spread assumption, the paper depict the spread process of the international terrorism and solve the expressions on terrorism groups share. On this basis, we propose cooperation agreement concept of a reasonable solution to the distribution of benefits. Implementation of the cooperation agreement will help to further improve the status of international terrorism.(2) International cooperation against terrorism facing the developed countries to adopt a "double standard" of the problem in the fight against terrorism, sequential reciprocal equilibrium theory balance national selfish benefit and the long reciprocal relationship. This offers a theory basis for facilitating international cooperation against terrorism and makes the international cooperation against terrorism model more perfect.