Study On The Game Model Between Govenment Regulation And Mine Pollution Management

The game between government regulation and mine pollution management is a specific application of game theory in the mining industry, and this paper makes study on this issue. In this paper, the government has two kinds of different fines, which are cumulative fines and single fine. At the same time, the types of mine pollution has been divided into two kinds, cumulative one and noncumulative one. It concludes that: In the absence of external supervision, all the mines taking measures to control the pollution can not reach a table equilibrium, but all the mines do not taking measures to control the pollution can reach a table equilibrium; In any case, the government adopt the accumulated fines are not desirable; In addition, on the premise of the government will take measures to supervision more or less, the mine will control the pollution; When the government adopts the single fine way and the mine pollution belongs to noncumulative, the situation become more complex. According to the game model, we can see that the government regulation probability and mine pollution probability will reach a equilibrium. However, in reality, this model will produce the following questions: First, the government has the pursuit of self-interest maximization strategy. The government can supervision the mine with a probability less than Nash equilibrium, and each time they can get the fine. Second, the government tends to focus on large mines and ignore small ones. Because the regulatory resources are limited, use the same regulatory resources to supervision the large mines can get more benefits than supervision the small mines. Third, the mine can cut costs by rent-seeking. In fact, the government supervision the mine with a probability less than Nash equilibrium and the mine pay the fine to them is not the best game equilibrium, because the mine can let the government stop taking measures to supervision through rent-seeking. Solutions to the above three questions are as follows:First, the key to solve the problem that the government wants to pursue the maximization of their own interests is to use the amount of mines which will take measures to control pollution as one kind of assessment of performance standards. If the number is less than the standard of qualified, then deduct relevant government personnel wages or dismiss them. If the number is more than the standard of qualified, then reward relevant government personnel or let them have a promotion. In addition, the government fines from the mine can only be used for regulation of mine, not for other purposes. This work along both sides, the government will not pursue the fine for the purpose to select regulation strategy, instead, they will supervision the mine as far as possible.Second, the reason for the government tends to focus on large mines and ignore small ones is that the regulatory resources are limited. So, reduce the cost of supervision, such as use the advanced detection technology and so on, can enrich the regulatory resources, which letting the government to regulate the small mines have the possibility of a reality. In addition, incorporating small mines or centralizing management to them can not only reduce the pollution emission, but also let the government regulate mine more convenient.Third, rent-seeking behavior in mines has inherent economic benefit drive, so the whole society need to supervise relevant regulatory authorities. The mine controls the pollution or not, local people known best. If the mine avoid control pollution responsibility through rent-seeking, the local people can be exposed to this, at the same time the central government must be held accountable for the responsibility of mine and the relevant regulatory authorities.In the end, for the whole society, keeping the supervision by public opinion pressure, make efforts to form a protect environment atmosphere, and a small amount of supervision of government can make the social welfare maximization.