Study On Behavior Of Corruption Of Public Officials And Anti-corruption Of Supervise Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Corruption is a social and historical phenomenon, it is both a historic problem and a worldwide problem. With the rapid development of society, corruption has highlighted a series of new features, like a vine which extends into every corner of society as a result of a threat to social stability. Today, the integration of world economic trends, corruption has become an international menace and anti-corruption has become an important element of international cooperation.Since entering the1990s, Domestic and foreign scholars on corruption and anti-corruption issues have great interest in research, literature on corruption and anti-corruption issues in the rapid accumulation of research. This paper summarizes the relevant literature, the existing literature from political science, economics, sociology, cultural studies, game theory, social networks, empirical studies of the seven categories, describes the research of corruption and anti-corruption issues and their research. Meanwhile, through the analysis of existing literature, studies have found that individuals are built on the "perfectly rational people" on the basis of this assumption. However, for individuals in the decision-making process it is impossible to be completely rational, the deficiency is to provide ideas for us.Through the study of evolutionary game theory, combined with the existing corruption and anti-corruption issues related to the research literature, the article established the corruption of public officials choose the mechanism of evolutionary game model, corruption of public officials and oversight mechanisms put anti-corruption in the evolutionary game model of choice. These two models are simulated by the mathematical software Matlab to study ho-w some of the main parameters influence each policy path in the evolution of the two models. According to the simulation results obtained:the costs and benefits in the face of corruption of public officials mutual cooperation influence the behavior of public officials choose; mutual expose corruption of public officials to effectively prevent corruption; increase the cost of corruption of public officials, party intensify supervision corruption of public officials is an effective means of supervision to curb corruption of public officials; under certain conditions, corruption of public officials and anti-corruption supervision of party Game with repeated and periodic evolution feature, which meet the "movement style corruption "feature. And the results are presented in a more targeted policy recommendations, but also analyzed the anti-corruption and corrupt practices have repeatedly and cyclical reasons, these conclusions on anti-corruption policies of China have a certain reference value.In this paper, evolutionary game theory problem of corruption and anti-corruption enrich our research methods to study the problem, enriched the research findings related to the problem of corruption and anti-corruption in China. By this method Research conclusions on corruption and anti-corruption issues are similar with most of the existing research findings, but the paper also proves existe-d research conclusions from other perspective, and it is found some results differe nt from the past.Finally, summed up the lack of innovation and new features in this paper combined with the current corruption ("cases" to "Woan") for future research were discussed anti-corruption, anti-corruption after a complex network research should start to observe individual acts of corruption in the evolution of complex networks, so as to put forward a more objective method of compliance with anti-corruption social progress.