Study On Antitrust Reviews Of Google’s Acquisition Of Motorola Mobility

On the15th day of August,2011, Google Company announced its plan to purchaseMotorola Mobility with a total amount of1.25billion dollars. Meanwhile, this transaction hadaroused a wide concern of antimonopoly censorships all around the world. On the13th day ofFebruary,2012, after close consultations, EU antitrust body passed this case unconditionallyas far as American antitrust agent granted it on the exact same day. On the19th day of May,China’s Ministry of Commerce approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobilityconditionally after several times to extend the period of reviewing. However, this judicial caseis special, not only because it is the largest aviation deal in the area of technology for thelatest ten years, but also it provides a symbol for antitrust norms of intellectual property rightsand international cooperation among antimonopoly agencies.From the view of antitrust scrutiny, this thesis mainly analyzes and resolves relativeproblems, in order to improve the system of antitrust review for intellectual property rightsand the mechanism of international cooperation with other antimonopoly agencies that Chinahas already established. After all, this thesis could be divided into four sections.Part Ⅰdescribes the whole procedure of Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility andexplains the legal ground under China’ s Ministry of Commerce. Its main research contentincludes the process of transaction, the path of anti-monopoly review by lots of countries andthe legal foundation of antitrust review by China’ s Ministry of Commerce, namely, theextraterritorial application of antitrust law.Part Ⅱ is about the analysis of antitrust reviews for Google’s acquisition of MotorolaMobility. For the conditional approval by China’s Ministry of Commerce, this part exploresthe conception of relevant market, calculates market share, level of concentration andcontrolling power, deliberates the possibility whether this acquisition would strengthenmarket access barrier and intensifies influence that such acquisition may bring to othercompetitors or potential competitors, probes into possible patent abuses in this case, based onthe foundation of existing laws and regulations. Specifically, this portion discusses three kindsof problems: firstly, the relevant market definition of Google and Motorola Mobility;secondly, the possibility whether Google would transfer its market status; thirdly, thecoincidence between patent-licensing pacts of Motorola Mobility and FRAND principle. After explicitly explaining those key issues, this thesis affirms the correctness of the decisionmade by China’s Ministry of Commerce, and makes a comment on subsidiary conditions forapproving this acquisition.Part Ⅲ makes a compare with different antitrust reviews from different countries.Confronting with distinct vetting procedures for Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobilityby various antitrust agencies, this part is aimed to understanding various procedures amongChina, USA, EU and other countries. It is designed to analyze substantive standards andregular programs on antitrust reviews, so as to make a comparative study on regularprocedures from those countries mentioned above and explore antimonopoly due diligence ondifferent nations. It primarily consists of following several aspects: first, substantive standardsand regular procedures on antitrust review programs; second, the contrast among thosenations on regular procedures of antitrust review; third, the difference between conditionalapproval and unconditional approval; fourth, different handlings for patent concentration onGoogle’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility. On explaining the route of antimonopoly reviewfrom all kinds of nations, this part, viewed from procedure and entity, discusses the shortageof our existing antitrust review system. So it is believed that improvement should be made.Part Ⅳ makes a suggestion for the perfection of our current antitrust review system forintellectual property rights and the mechanism of international cooperation. In face ofproblems, this section puts forward with some solutions: first, there is a necessity for ournation to build up an antitrust review system to deal with the concentration of intellectualproperty rights with reference to USA and EU. From the view of the related entity lawmaking,Ministry of Commerce should enact and elaborate antimonopoly guidelines for theconcentration of intellectual property rights to accommodate the ever-growing cases; second,the adequate mechanism of international cooperation between antimonopoly agencies is alsonecessary. International cooperation becomes more important to meet the need of reality anddevelopment of economy. Therefore, it is essential to set up and consummate the bilateralantitrust cooperation system.