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Ernest Adams’s Theory Of Indicative Conditionals

Posted on:2015-12-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X D ZouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2285330467451440Subject:Logic
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Conditional is always an interesting issue for philosophers and logicians, who usually research the conditions for the truth or assertability of Conditionals before1960s. Until1968, Robert Stalnaker gives a formal semantics for conditionals, which lay the logic of conditional as a branch of philosophical logic, named conditional logic. In the first chapter, this paper, in order to disclose what Conditional is, firstly classifies Conditionals from different criteria. Secondly the paper focuses on the indicative conditional and briefly analyzes the logic of indicative conditional from three different perspectives:Material Implication, Possible world semantics, Probabilistic semantics. In a word, there are two opinions of the indicative conditional among the three approaches. One side thinks that indicative conditional has truth value, while the other side thinks that indicative conditional lack truth value. In the second chapter the paper mainly researches what Ernest Adams’s opinion of indicative conditional. It is worth to see that Adams gives two hypotheses:one is that the truth and assertability of indicative conditional are different, and the other is that the reasoning of indicative conditional should match the standard of probability validity besides truth validity. Adams definitely believes that the probability of indicative conditional is conditional probability, notably which is not the same with Stalnaker’s thesis. The difference is that Adams thinks that the probability of indicative conditional is the assertability of indicative conditional, while Stalnaker thinks that the probability of indicative conditional is the truth of indicative conditional. According to Adams’s thesis, it is the reasoning of indicative conditional that don’t match the standard of probability validity, which results in the paradoxes of material implication. In the third chapter the paper firstly discusses two aspects which Adams avoid dealing with. Secondly the paper points out that we should distinguish the indicative conditional and the logic of indicative conditional. the paper finally suggests to study the logic of indicative conditional with philosophical logic. With regard to the indicative conditional, the paper regards the indicative conditional as philosophical issues, such as cause and effect, fatalism.
Keywords/Search Tags:Indicative conditional, logic of Indicative conditional, Philosophical logic, Triviality results, Adams’ thesis
PDF Full Text Request
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