The Korean Peninsula Issue In The Process Of Sino-U.S.Relaxation

The relationship between China and the United States had been fixed in confrontation since the Korean War, which was full of the Cold War ideology. However, practical consideration of national interests has not been concealed. Both countries have carefully avoided making the same mistake, eventually moving toward "shake hands". This article focuses on the Korean Peninsula issue in the process of Sino-U.S. relaxation. It primarily analyzes and interprets the Korean Peninsula issue during the Sino-U.S. talks in detail, pay attention to describe American negotiation strategies and China’s changed negotiating positions, thus revealing conclusion of this paper that a tacit understanding have been reached to maintain the status quo and stability of the Korean Peninsula between China and the United States. The Sino-U.S. relaxation promoted to ease the situation inside the Korean Peninsula. The two countries have been committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, imposing constraints on their ally since then, thus ensuring the inter-Korean conflicts be "Localization" and the Korean War didn’t repeat itself.In addition to the Preface and Conclusion, this thesis is divided into four chapters.The first chapter mainly discusses the Nixon administration adjusted U.S. strategy in Asia in the early stage of this government came to power, then traces the historical evolution of the U.S.-ROK and the Sino-DPRK alliances relationship since the Korean War. The substantive content of U.S. Asia policy adjustments can be summarized as limited contraction and balance of power diplomacy, which means the United States shrunk its Asia obligation while need ease Sino-U.S. relations to maintain balance of power in Asia-Pacific area. This ensured the continuation of its Asia-Pacific security system and maintained peace and stability of situation in Asia. As for the Korean Peninsula, China and America have always insisted the common bottom line to handle relations with their respective ally since the Korean War, that is to avoid another direct conflict between themselves. This "convergent" stand was exactly in conformity with the connotation of Nixon administration’s Asia policy adjustments, hence laid the foundation for exchanges and cooperation between the two counties on the Korean Peninsula issue.The second chapter describes in detail the preparations made for Kissinger’s visit, the concrete talks process of Kissinger’s secret visit to China in July and his second China visit in October. Primarily the preparations provided comprehensive guiding documents, establishing its negotiating strategy for Kissinger’s trip. In the secret China visit in July, Kissinger highlighted the role of containment and balance the US military presence in Asia has played by emphasizing the "Soviet threat" and the "Japanese threat", especially the latter. As a result, Zhou Enlai’s position changed subtly on some issues such as the requirement that American army should withdraw from China’s neighboring and the attitude toward the U.S.-Japan security relationship. However, the two sides didn’t talk too much about the Korean Peninsula issue for lacking of sufficient attention from America. Kissinger came to China again in October, the two sides had more detailed exchanges about the Korean Peninsula issue. Kissinger tempted repeatedly whether there is a common interest between them in maintaining the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Although he didn’t give affirmation directly, Zhou Enlai urged the United States to ensure preventing Japanese into the South Korea, withdrawing ultimately, opposing the South Korea attack the North Korea and recognizing the North Korea internationally. In fact, what he required was to seek the external security for this goal. Furthermore, the two sides reached a consensus about imposing constraints on their respective ally’s provocative actions. Therefore, China and the United States initially formed a tacit understanding to maintain the status quo and peace on the Korean Peninsula.The third chapter also describes in detail the preparations made for Nixon’s visit and the talks between Nixon and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai during his visit, besides the formation of the Sino-US Shanghai Communique. Preliminary preparations also provided reference documents for Nixon’s negotiating skills and strategies, mainly for giving formal confirmation to positions on major issues Kissinger had stated in his two China visit. During his visit, Nixon and Mao reached a strategic consensus on Sino-U.S. mutual nonthreatening. On the Korean Peninsula issue, China and America shared the common concern on how to "cooperate" to ensure the peninsula’s status quo and stability. Nixon was more concerned about constraints on their respective ally, while Zhou Enlai remained stress the United States guarantee to prevent Japanese into the South Korea. The final confirmation was given to their tacit understanding during the talks. The Shanghai Communique contained only a few words related to the Korean Peninsula, but the Sino-US understanding has already implied in the carefully worded communique language. The Communique provided indispensable provisions-protection for maintaining the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula.The fourth chapter focuses on the impact of Sino-US relaxation and their tacit understanding of the Korean Peninsula issue on the situation of this peninsula. The North Korea and the South Korea had different perception to Sino-US relaxation. The North saw opportunities to promote the withdrawal of US troops, prevent Japanese expansion to the Korean Peninsula and achieve reunification dominated by the North, while the South felt aggressive threat from the North and fear of being abandoned by America. However, both sides chose dialogue with the other to respond to the changing situation. The internal situation in the Korean Peninsula was temporarily moving toward relaxation. Meantime China and the United States also encouraged and promoted the inter-Korean Peninsula dialogue, tried to avoid public debate in the international community so as not to hinder relaxation inter-Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, they exerted influence positively to constraint their ally’s adventures, and urged each other to exert the same influence. Their tacit understanding formed during the meetings got continued.The conclusion summarizes that national interests are priorities in China and the United States diplomatic decision-making. Throughout the entire negotiation process between China and the United States, the Korean Peninsula issue was placed under the frame of relations among major powers(USA、China、Soviet and Japan). The U.S. negotiating strategies were slightly better. They highlighted the containment and balance role in its Asia-Pacific security system by emphasizing threat from Soviet and Japan, thus forcing China to make concessions on the U.S. military withdrawal, U.S.-Japan security relations and other issues. Eventually, the two countries reached a tacit understanding to maintain the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Sino-U.S. relaxation promoted limited relaxation internal Korean Peninsula, their tacit understanding has also been extended. The Korean conflict can only be limited to the corner of the Korean Peninsula.