China 's Penalty Income And Management Normative Research

As a part of the non-tax government revenues, Penalty and Confiscatory income belongs to the fiscal revenue. In the current condition of the asymmetry between power and property, many local governments can hardly realize their functions by sole relying on existing income, forcing local governments to increase their income by all means. Their income has expanded sharply due to the random collection of Penalty and Confiscatory income, which has become a solid source to make up the financial shortages if local governments. In the Penalty and Confiscatory income collection and management, events such as "to be punished escrow", "fishing enforcement" are not rare, especially when traffic department, the public security department, the environmental protection department and other law enforcement agencies have set penalty measurement individually, which leads to overlapping penalties, finally resulting in the contrast between the current Penalty and Confiscatory income scale and the purpose of Penalty and Confiscatory management. In fact, as one of the government law enforcements, the purpose of Penalty and Confiscatory charges is to prevent certain behavior. Under the well-designed confiscation system, illegal behavior should be decreasing. Therefore, regulating national Penalty and Confiscatory income management system, and the penalty collection management system, is important for the government to perform the function of supervision efficiently and increase its public creditability effectively.This paper uses empirical analysis, normative analysis, words analysis and chart analysis, and uses foreign studies for reference, to study the current problem of domestic Penalty and Confiscatory income in depth. This paper starts with the explanation of the Penalty and Confiscatory income concept and characteristics, and collects the related theories, including negative externalities correction theory, fairness and efficiency theory and principal-agent theory. Based on the analysis of the present situation of Penalty and Confiscatory income in China, the paper also studiesthe overall size of the Penalty and Confiscatory income, which includes the scale of the central government and local government. The paper also improves that the domestic fiscal income is depend on Penalty and Confiscatory income to a certain degree by using the correlative analysis of fiscal income and Penalty and Confiscatory income. By comparing the growth rate of Penalty and Confiscatory income with per-capita disposable income of urban residents and CPI respectively, this paper analyzes the present scale of Penalty and Confiscatory income in China. It also explains the cause of increasing popularity of “punishment escrow” through a simple game theory. According to the underlying causes and background of the above problems, factors that influence the Penalty and Confiscatory income management are categorized by regular analysis and irregular analysis. It concludes that the irregular factors are unreasonable financial system, profit-driven local governments, violation of the purpose of penalty charge management by relevant department against, management link problem and the unreliable supervision mechanism. Finally, on the basis of using the experience of South Korea, Singapore and other foreign governments’ experience,and in combination with China current situation, suggestions of solving those irrational problems and building up a comprehensive Penalty and Confiscatory income system are raised in this paper.