External Corporate Governance And Maximizing Shareholder Wealth

"Corporate governance" has been the focus of theory and practice research. There are many domestic and foreign literature related to corporate governance. However, their research object or focus range just is internal corporate governance generally, and rarely talk about the external corporate governance. At present, there are disagreements for the definition of external corporate governance, some key concepts are still lack of a unified expression. External corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization are still a relatively new research topic, few scholars use case analysis method to study the subject. In this paper, the research object is GOME, analyze the external corporate governance situation of GOME from m&a market, media supervision, institutional investors three aspects and study the role of external corporate governance in corporate governance from a new perspective of shareholder wealth maximization.This article mainly divides into five parts. The first chapter presents the research background and significance of this article, summarizes the related domestic and foreign literature and illustrates the research contents, research methods and innovative points. The second chapter mainly defines the concept and the composing of the corporate governance, internal corporate governance and external corporate governance. And introduces the theoretical basis, including the contract theory, principal-agent theory and incomplete contract theory. The third chapter introduces the general situation of GOME and reviews the beginning and end of the battle for control rights. The last part is a detailed analysis of the internal corporate governance structure of GOME. The fourth chapter is the key research contents, this part analyzes the external corporate governance situation of GOME and its impact on shareholder wealth maximization from m&a market, media supervision and institutional investors three aspects. The fifth chapter is epilogue. This chapter summarizes the full text based on the results of the above analysis and points out the limitations of this study.The main conclusion of this article: pure pursuit of scale expansion of mergers and acquisitions will have negative impact on shareholder wealth maximization; the supervision of the media for the enterprise could improve the enterprise value and maximize shareholder wealth; institutional investors participate in corporate governance, which is beneficial to the realization of shareholder wealth maximization.