Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Based On Energy Decision

The whole supply chain network is divided into two layers with the government’s accession, the upper layer is government, The lower layer is multiple competing members of the supply chain network. The government plays a dominant role in the whole supply chain network, sets tax policy, then controls energy consumption and emission of the lower layer’s members by tax policy. The lower layer’s members belong to followers. They aim to seek the balance between maximize profits and emission control according to the government’s tax policy. Through analyzing the Stackelberg game between government and another members of the supply chain network, and the Nash non-cooperative game among members of the supply chain network, Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium model based on bi-level programming is constructed. Then the model is solved by penalty function method. Finally, the validity of the model and algorithm are illustrated by numerical example.This paper’s main research contents and innovations are as follows:(1) This paper studies on the supply chain network equilibrium problem. This problem aims to achieve the goal of energy-saving and emission-reduction under government’s macro-control. Then optimal strategy among government, manufacturer and demand-market by using variational inequality is described. Finally, the equilibrium condition of the supply chain network is found. Combined with the numerical example, this paper analyzes the impact of government’s macro-control on the supply chain network equilibrium.(2) Considering the long-term of energy-saving and emission-reduction, in case of the energy development and improvement of production technology, this paper studies on the influence of the new energy application and the cost reduction on the supply chain network equilibrium.