Logistics Public Information Platform Freight Forwarding Matching And Credibility Motivation Mechanism

Along with rapid development of logistics industry, especially road transportation, various kinds of logistic public information platforms start to emerge. The logistic public information platform offers a platform for vehicle owners and consignors who are looking for deals and makes the owners find out supply of goods as soon as possible and depart in time. Consignors can easily find out a carriage vehicle in order to deliver goods arriving at the destination as soon as possible. However, with respect to numerously complicated sources of vehicles and information of freight sources, owners and consignors are hard to decide which party is the suitable side of transaction. Nonetheless, current logistic public information platforms exist a lot of false information of freight sources, which seriously affect the reputation and transaction efficiency of platforms. Therefore, providing a relatively open and practical evaluation method for owners and consignors with a rank order in those transaction parties and a credibility motivation system with true sources of goods has become a key issue to figure out in this paper.This paper has introduced a weight improvement method of “feedback competitive law” that limits the value range of each factor weight on the basis of initial weight. Meanwhile, the improvement of this weight won’t influence other competitors’ integrated assessment values as the constraint, which makes all competitors’ weight improvement similar to Pareto Optimal perfection. After obtaining the optimal weight from each competitor, these weight vectors will be merged to get a comprehensive weight. Then this comprehensive weight is deeded as an initial weight to repeat aforementioned improving procedure until meeting some certain requirements. With regard to each competitor, this confirmed weight is a comprehensive weight on the basis of not damaging the integrated assessment value of any parties. Therefore, it is relatively fair.This paper has utilized a signal game model, analyzed the effectiveness of member grading mechanism in the logistic public information platform, and restrained the non-credible behaviors via properly setting up penalty costs and expected risk costs. In the meanwhile, the platform provides the different services for various levels of members and makes them get significantly different expectations and benefits from the platform thereby achieving distinct incentive effects. This not only takes example for platform strategies, but also provides a theory evidence for establishment of system.