| Trade-in has great potential in both "low carbon" and "economy", attracting the attentions from the fields of academy and enterprises, as well as the government policy. However, there are very few literatures studying trade-in from the point of closed-loop supply chain, and most of these literatures only focus on the analysis of economic performance instead of the environmental performance. This dissertation will study the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) models with trade-in from both the sides of economic performance and environmental economic performance.From the side of channel structures, three kinds of CLSC models with trade-in without considering the third-party collector are built in this dissertation, including the centralized decision model (Model C), the retailer selling and collecting (Model R), and the retailer selling and the manufacturer collecting (Model M). By solving the models, we find under different conditions of parameters, there may exist three styles of optimal collection strategies, i.e., no collection, partial collection, and full collection. Though in terms of the economic performance, trade-in can boost the customers’ demand and improve the enterprises’ profits, it may not bring any better environmental performance according to the life-cycle assessment methods. In addition, by comparatively analyzing the optimal solutions, we find in terms of the economic performance, for the profits obtained by the manufacturer and the whole supply chain system, Model C dominates Model M and Model M dominates Model R; for the retailer’s profits, Model M is dominated by Model R; in terms of the environmental performance, Model R is the best model among the three CLSC models.Besides, the three models are extended by considering the third-party collector. Two kinds of models with the third-party collector are considered, including the manufacturer selling and the third-party collector collecting model (Model M3P) and the retailer selling and the third-party collector collecting model (Model R3P), and the corresponding optimal collection strategies are given to both of them. Finally, the results from numerical experiments show that the involvement of the third-party collector is bad to the profits of the whole system, but may improve the environmental performance. |
