| The peasant joint security loan first appeared in Bangladesh, its main purpose is to provide credit support for the poor farmers who have financing needs, but lack sufficient real cover and are unable to obtain loans from formal financial institutions, to help them get rid of poverty. To all facts, foreign joint security loan not only attains the aim of supporting the poor, but also achieves a high rate of redemption (Professor Yunus pointed out that the Grameen Bank’s loan repayment rate reached98.9%in his speech at the Peking University). However, since the joint security loan was introduced into China in the1990s, there have been many problems in our actual operation. Parts of the loan organizations face the risk of closure due to the very low rates of redemption. So what are the causes of the situation that peasant joint security loan mode is feasible in theory and in foreign practical operation, but not good in the actual operations in China? In another way, what are the factors which affect the peasant joint security loan repayment rate in China? This is the key question to solve in this study.In the theoretical part of this paper firstly, according to my collection of relevant literatures, I have carried on full account of the concept, characteristic, mechanism of action and the situation of present research of the peasant joint security loan. Then, combined with the previous theory and with the use of the methods of game theory and information economics, this paper analyzes the game behavior between the main bodis of the peasant joint security loans, finds out the factors influencing farmers’strategy choice behavior, and analyzes what kind of impact the factors have on the farmers’will of selecting the "repayment" strategy. The results of the theoretical research show that social capital, future demand for loan and the ability of farmers’using the loan to create income have positive effects on the repayment willingness. Whereas the loan limit of farmers has a negative effect on the repayment willingness.The empirical part uses an empirical model to test the results of the theoretical analysis. We select the Logit model and use the analysis of principle components to solve the multi-collinearity matters among variables. The variables are selected from the four factors of the theoretical part. In addition, in order to avoid the problem of stochastic error sequence correlation caused by the omission of important explanatory variables, according to the actual situation, we introduce the factor measuring the intensity of farmers being monitored. The result of the empirical analysis is consistent with the theoretical analysis.This paper has important theoretical and practical significance. In the aspect of theory, first of all, this study adopts the methods of game theory and information economics to provide a new idea and good way to solve the problem of farmers’ loan problems in China. Secondly, this study reveals the function of Rural Micro Credit in China’s rural financial market, and provides the theory basis for the construction of China’s rural financial reform and the new financial system. In the aspect of practice, on the one hand, by the research of the repayment behavior and guarantee behavior of the agricultural households, the asymmetry of information between farmers can be reduced. This is good for the financial institutions to identify borrowers more accurately, and reduce the loan defaults. On the other hand, by the research of the factors affecting on loan repayment behavior by farmers and the guarantee behavior, it can provide a reference for the financial institutions to establish a credit risk assessment model, so that they can identify the quality of farmers and improve loan repayment rate, so as to promote the sustainable development of Rural Micro Credit business. |
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