Control Structure, Product Market Competition And Information Disclosure Of Listed Company

The listed company is the cornerstone of stock market, and its information disclosure is the main source of information in the stock market. Good information disclosure is an important mechanism to solve information asymmetry in the capital market, and also a major means to mitigate agency conflicts between principal and agent, and is vitally important to protect interests of investors, to optimize resource allocation and maintain the effectiveness and efficiency of stock market.However, Chinese stock market witnessed a large number of information disclosure problems, for example, some listed companies don’t take the initiative to disclose information or in time, and the information disclosure is lack of standardization, even the information are distorted, incomplete, what’s worse, a variety of financial scandals have occurred in listed companies. With the occurrence of Yin Guangxia Scandal, the regulatory authorities launched a number of policies and regulations and also amended the relevant laws to regulate the information disclosure of listed companies, but information disclosure problems still appear continuously, such as Hangxiao incidents, which shows that the root cause of information disclosure problems does not lie in the information disclosure system itself, but rather imperfect, no sound corporate governance mechanism.According to the theory of modern corporate governance, the organic combination of company internal and external mechanisms is premise of good corporate governance, and the control structure is a main criterion index of the internal corporate governance structure, product market competition is regarded as a key external governance mechanisms. This paper begins with analyzing the influencing factors—company’s internal and external level factors—of information disclosure, and then select the2010data of in Shenzhen board A-share listed companies to examine the relationship between the firm internal governance mechanism, product market competition and information disclosure using logistic regression model. The empirical results proved that, the reasonable arrangements for the control structure is conducive to the improvement of information disclosure quality, and the product market competition plays the vital role in promoting information disclosure through collaborating with control structure, that is, product market competition produces mutual substitution effect for board of directors governance (proportion of independent directors in board), and forms mutual complementary effect on with shareholders governance (property of shareholder, the shareholding ratio of the first shareholder control, the shareholding ratio of executive).