Information non-transparency of the family controlled listed corporations in China is acommon phenomenon,and brings some adverse impacts to its own development and thenormal operation of the market economy. According to relevant research, corporate governanceas well as external environment, such as product market competition influences the quality ofinformation disclosure. The “one share big alone†and family-control in family controlled listedcorporations makes its principal-agent relationship and governance pattern different fromnon-family controlled listed corporations. Based on the family controlled listed corporationsfrom2007to2011on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this study examines therelationship between product market competition, corporate governance and the quality ofinformation disclosure in family controlled listed corporations from ownership governance anddirectorate governance two aspects.The empirical results show that, product market competition of family controlled listedcorporations is associated with lower quality of information disclosure. In terms of ownershipconstruction, the ownership concentration and the divergence between voting rights and cashflow rights are associated with lower quality of information disclosure. However, the degree of“check–and-balance of stock ownership†does not play the role as we expected, has nosignificant effect on the quality of information disclosure. In addition, product marketcompetition can improve the lever of ownership construction, and thus enhance the quality ofinformation disclosure. What’s more, the findings also show that corporate board sizeã€the unityof chairman and general manager and the creation of designated committees are associate withhigher quality of information disclosure.The dissertation provides reference value to how to improve the quality of informationdisclosure of family controlled listed corporations, and thus to promote the healthydevelopment of family controlled listed corporations. |