The Research On Regulatory Effect Of Information Disclosure Of Listed Companies In China

Chinese capital market is in the process of transition from emerging market to mature market. The disclosure of information which is true, complete and timely by the listed companies is the cornerstone of the healthy development of the capital market. China has promulgated a series of laws, rules and regulations to regulate the information disclosure of listed companies. However, the incidence of illegal disclosure of relevant information of listed companies is growing. From early Shenzhen Wilderness, Red Industry to later events such as the Zhengbaiwen, Yinguangxia. Financial fraud and false information disclosure behavior of listed companies intensified. The typical violation disclosure behavior such as postpone disclosure, false records, material omissions severe blow to investor confidence, to the detriment of the interests of investors, is extremely detrimental to the development of Chinese capital market. So strengthen information disclosure of listed companies and supervision, improve regulatory effectiveness is still a common focus of theorists and practitioners.Firstly from information failure theory, efficient market theory, game theory point of view, we demonstrated the need for information disclosure regulation. And then the paper analyzed the problems and the reasons for information disclosure and supervision of the securities market in China. On this basis, the paper used penalties data of listed companies from2008to2011to research Chinese current regulatory effectiveness by empirical research. Through researching overall market reaction in the penalties announcement day before and after ten days of the companies who were punished, we found that Chinese securities market information disclosure regulation play a role. However, the effect was not significant. Then we studied the regulatory effect of different types of punishment. We found that in public reprimand, a warning and a fine of punishment brought the stock negative excess returns and publicly criticize almost did not have a negative impact on the stock price. Therefore,we conclude that the higher the openness of punishment, the greater the punishment, the punishment brought more obvious effects. Finally, the paper put forward some suggestions for information disclosure regulatory issues to improve the regulatory system of information disclosure of listed companies in China and the quality of accounting information, to protect the interests of investors, so that Chinese capital market run standardly and effectively.