| With the development of science and technology and the rise of e-commerce, online auctionprovides people with the convenience of online transactions as an open auction. It reduces thecost of the auction business organization and bid auction. However, it abets the bidding fraud ofonline trading and blocks the online auction trading honestly because of the low registration cost,the low identify risks and the long decision time. The issues is to be researched and solved.In this paper, according to the auction theory, the related basic theories and methods ofgame theory, the probable cheating styles of shill bidding under the first price sealed bid andsecond price sealed bid auction were discussed for the lack of theoretical research of differentonline auction. In the relative value model, the honest bidder’s equilibrium strategy under eachauction was analyzed. Additionally, the expected revenue of tenderers, the probability of shill bid,the value distribution on the basis of the "shill " bid, and the valuation distribution of the tendererwere comparison analyzed. The main results are that the bidders could gain the maximalexpected revenue under first price sealed bid auction. The expected revenue and biddingequilibrium strategy under relative value model of second price sealed bid auction were thesame.Secondly, this paper is discussed the interdependence of decision-making and mixed Nashequilibrium problem under the independent private value model and the uniformly distributed,which is based on the cooperative game theory and considering the cost facts and withoutconsidering. It were analyzed without considering the cost factors and considering two aspectsrespectively. It was found regulation game penalty coefficient and made an offer for the seller’ssupervision mechanism. And then it researches the relationship among the penalty value,optimal check probability and the check accuracy probability.The paper provide a theoreticalbasis to effectively curb in the online auction bid. |
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