Information Disclosure Of Equity Incentive Managers Game Model To Study

Equity incentive by allowing managers access to the equity of the enterprise, so thatmanagers have the right to certain equity interests, and thus with shareholders share to theinterests of the corporate risk in the enterprise, so that the interests of employees withcorporate interests greater degree of consistency, and thus can more diligently considered fordevelopment.Phenomenon of phase separation of ownership and management of modernenterprises, enterprise managers to become party information superiority, out of self-interestto maximize motivation, managers may be false corporate disclosure, and thus be endangeringthe interests of the shareholders and investment,. Enterprise managers such informationcheating there are many, such as Enron, Xerox, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and othercompanies, are due to this problem and eventually lead to bankruptcy. Therefore it is verynecessary to study the information disclosure behavior of corporate managers in the equityincentive conditions.In this paper, on the managers discussed the research status of information disclosureissue, combined with the reality of today’s market economy status, disclosed under theconditions of the equity incentive managers information from both the research.(1) study the game model of supervision between equity incentive managers andshareholders. First introduced appetite for risk managers, completely rational players involvedcloser to the actual, use of incomplete information static game theory to study the Authoritygame model based on the managers under the conditions of different risk preferences andshareholders,obtained Bayesian Nash equilibrium that managers with different riskpreferences, analyze information disclosure policy choices. Secondly, the use of evolutionarygame theory to study, the evolution the game model of managers and shareholders to overseeis studied, the policy choices relations between managers and shareholders is analyzed, thefactors affecting the game participant strategy chosen to illustrate draw some control andreduce the business managers fraud measures.(2) study the game model of reinvestment between equity incentive managers andshareholders. First introduced appetite for risk managers, completely rational players involvedcloser to the actual, use of incomplete information static game theory to study thereinvestment game model based on the managers under the conditions of different riskpreferences and shareholders,obtained Bayesian Nash equilibrium that managers with different risk preferences, analyze information disclosure policy choices. Secondly, the use ofevolutionary game theory to study, the evolution the game model of managers andshareholders to reinvest is studied, the policy choices relations between managers andshareholders is analyzed, the factors affecting the game participant strategy chosen toillustrate draw some control and reduce the business managers fraud measures.The end of the article to illustrate the inadequacies of this study, and some outlookinformation disclosure issues for managers today’s market economy status quo, combinedwith the research status at home and abroad.