The Research Of The Influence Of Institutional Investors On Top

In recent decades, with the gradually improvement of capital market and laws, institutional investors have begun to gradually highlight in the securities market, including the securities companies, securities funds and other institutional investors. Due to the successful implementation of the reform of non-tradable shares, our country securities market system produced major change, which also provides supervision benefit motives to institutional investors and qualifies institutional investors. With the increase of stake, and the degree of checks and balances, institutional investors have started to get involved in corporate governance actively, and participate in the construction and improvement of compensation mechanism.Now in joint-stock company, the shareholders control the ownership of the company, but the professional managers master the right of management. The pursuits of the interests are different, and then principal-agent problem arises. Institutional investors are thought to contribute to solving this problem.Financial crisis and European debt crisis make the performance of many manufacturing companies decline, but executive pay are rising.Manufacturing industry has important significance to the development of national economy, and China’s economy is in transition period at present, It is necessary to research of institutional investors with executive compensation performance sensitivity.This article studied and analyzed the influence of the institutional investor shareholding proportion and balance degree on Top-managers’Pay Performance Sensitivity.This paper is divided into five parts:Chapter1:introduction, including research background and significance of this article, research ideas and content, research methods, and the main contribution and deficiency in this paper. This chapter illustrates the background and research framework for the research, and lays a foundation for later.Chapter2:Literature review. The concepts of institutional investor and top-managers’pay performance sensitivity are defined. And then reviews the literature at home and abroad.Chapter3:the theoretical analysis. Firstly the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, incentive theory, contract theory of the compensation are summarized, Secondly, the writer has discussed the positive and negative factors of institutional investor for executive pay performance sensitivity.Chapter4:empirical analysis. This section Includes research assumptions, sample selection, research variables, model building, empirical process and results analysis, the robustness analysis, which have tested the role of institutional investors on executive pay performance sensitivity.Chapter5:research conclusions and policy recommendations. The writer has explained the empirical research conclusion, besides, put forward policy suggestions.The main contributions of this paper:(1) the point cut is novel.(2) The writer chose net assets profit margin, return on equity considerations the company’s performance at the same time to reflect corporate performance.(3) At present, few domestic scholars in view of the manufacturing documents. This research is important for the development of manufacturing industry.This paper has some defects:(1) not classifying institutional investors into different kinds.(2) Control scalar not contain difficult quantitative indicators, it is lack of a comprehensive.(3) Little data lead to lack of representativeness.