Analysis Of The Governance Structure In The Rural Credit Cooperatives

Rural credit cooperatives as the main force of China’s rural financial, plays an important role in supporting the development of the rural economy. However, because of the history, policy, system and other factors of China’s rural credit cooperatives, there are many problems in the system design of the rural credit cooperatives, those seriously affect the operation and development of the rural credit cooperatives. China began the macro-system design in2000, opened deeper reform of rural credit cooperatives. The government positioned rural credit cooperatives as community-based local financial institutions for farmers, agriculture and rural economic development services in2003and handed the management authority over to the provincial government. The provincial associated press began to manage rural credit cooperatives. At present, China classifies the implementation of the joint-stock, stock cooperative system, cooperative and other property rights system, to make rural credit cooperatives truly become "self-management, self-discipline, self-development, self-risk" new market players.In the external and internal management governance of the rural credit cooperatives, multiple interests are involved. Because the government does not sufficiently consider the reaction of stakeholders in the policy formulation, most of the time policy can not be implemented or the implementation is far from the targets. The phenomenon shows that game theory does not be used to analysis policy. Due to the lack of efficient internal governance in the internal management, the manage risk of rural credit cooperatives increases, and the efficiency of management reduces. The goal of corporate governance is to balance the main responsibilities, rights and interests, and design incentive and restraint mechanism to keep balance between the different subjects, so as to maximize the interest of the target subject. Due to the special status of rural credit cooperatives in the rural finance, the boundaries of its corporate governance framework should be expanded. The stakeholder governance develops from the owner to operators, finally to the co-governance of owners, operators, stakeholders, the state, local governments and other institutions. Eventually rural credit cooperatives reflect the governance structure of the combination of external governance and internal governance.Current research on the governance of rural credit cooperatives draws a series of r results, from policy level to management level. But these achievements are rarely involved in the interests of the deep-seated problems, and lack systematic exposition of the interests of the game between external governance and internal governance. On the basis of the results of previous studies, this paper tries to study the governance issues of rural credit cooperatives with the method of game theory. For in-depth analysis of the governance of the rural credit cooperatives interest groups, the paper attempts to study both external governance and internal governance. Considering the division of governance structure, the paper argues that external corporate governance is based on the theory of competition in the market and the macro-control. The funders operate a control to the company through capital market, factor market, law and politics, to ensure the realization of a reasonable return. Internal corporate governance is based on the theory of property rights. The funders of the company form institutional arrangements among funders, board of directors and senior managers, to protect investors’ interests. The former focuses on the institutional arrangements, while the latter focuses on management control. There are strong similarities between them. They both have a control structure of self-loop and self-management, and the final goal is to achieve its economic and social benefits of rural credit cooperatives, but the scope and content are different.This paper uses the game model to analyze the problems in the current corporate governance structure, and learns from the successful experience of foreign rural credit cooperatives corporate governance, and makes in-depth study advanced experience and practices in the external governance and internal governance of rural credit cooperatives, and to analyze the reasons for its success from a game theory perspective. Through studying abroad success stories, we refine success factors, and provide a reference for the reform of rural credit cooperatives in China. To fundamentally change the trend of the alienation of the rural credit cooperatives corporate governance, property rights reform of rural credit cooperatives must advance firstly. We must adhere to the "three rural" in the reform of property rights, and adhere to the principle of market-oriented operation, and adhere to the guidance of classification, and strengthen rural cooperative financial legislation, to achieve the sustainable development of rural credit cooperatives. In addition, we should improve access and exit mechanism of rural financial market, and strengthen the management system of rural credit cooperatives, and improve the system of rural financial policy support, ultimately to achieve a balance of external and internal corporate governance structure of rural credit cooperatives.