The Study On The Impact Of China’s State-owned Listed Company Board Of Directors Structure On The Corporate Performance

As one of the most important component of a modern company, the board acts as a decision-making and supervisory bodies in corporate governance, who plays a decisive role on business performance. Among the relationship between shareholders, board and managers, the Board of Directors between shareholders and managers in the internal governance of listed companies, the board plays a role of bridge which connected the shareholders and managers, which is the core of the internal governance structure. A standardized and efficient board of is the key to building a modern corporate governance structure. Board structure is an important feature of the board, whose rationality has a great influence on the board’s operation. Unreasonable board structure will produce inefficient board behavior which led to poor corporate performance.This paper reviewed the related literature and theory about the board structure, such as principal-agent theory, theory of corporate governance, external control theory, etc. Through the establishment of the theoretical model, the paper study how the optimal scale and structure of the board of directors influence the company value. C Combined with the model results and existing research results we analysis the influence mechanism of board of directors structure on the corporate performance, and define the board structure factors:the proportion of state-owned shares, the board of directors for the scale, the proportions of the independent directors, setting conditions of chairman of the board and CEO, the board of directors’salary and the shareholding, the board meeting times. Then the paper set up the comprehensive index of evaluation on corporate performance and proposed the research hypotheses.This paper collected the2009-2011data of state-owned company in the Shanghai-listed, then introduced the current situation of board structure and corporate performance of China’s state-owned listed company, and then created a cross-section data estimation model to empirically analyze the effect of board structure on corporate performance. Both theoretical models and empirical results show that:1) the relationship between board size and company performance are inverted U-shaped;2) the proportion of independent directors, the remuneration of the board and the annual number of board meetings are positively correlated with corporate performance;3) situation of chairman and general manager is negatively related to the company performance, that is to say, when the two posts are separated, the cooperate performance will be better. The results of other variables (the proportion of state-owned shares and the shareholding of the board) are not very satisfactory; it may be related to the special circumstances of our country.Finally according to the foregoing viewpoint this article summary conclusion and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations, one is to improve the policy laws and regulations on the construction of the board of directors of the state-owned enterprises, standardizing the management of the board of directors; The second is to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, improving the selecting mechanism of the board of directors of the state-owned enterprises; The third is standardizing the size of the board reasonably; Four is to improve the system of independent directors, enhancing the independence of the board of directors; Five is the establishment of director incentive system; The sixth is the separation of position of chairman and general manager, improving the objectivity of the strategies of the company; Seven is to perfect the decision-making mechanism.