Research On Retail Supply Chain Game Model From The Perspective Of Supply Chain Financing

With the developing of material life, the relationship of retail supply chain andeverybody is becoming closer and closer, and the retail supply chain is more and moreimportant too. There are many small and medium-sized enterprises between theupstream of retail supply chain and customers, which play an important role in thischain. In China, the ratio of the above-scale enterprises in small and medium-sizedenterprises is99%, who create over60%of GDP. But in the mean time, the greatmajority of small and medium-sized enterprises are bothered by the problems of lackingfunds and financing difficulties. The credit line for small and medium-sized enterprisesis less than1%in the whole credit line of commercial banks. Therefore, the corecompany of retail supply chain has driven power to innovate financing model for smalland medium-sized enterprises in the up and down-stream of the chain. So, the researchof retail supply chain game is critical in the condition of funding constraints andfinancing considering. The content of this thesis is below after the theory and generalreview study.In the beginning, this thesis analyzes the base of supply chain financing model onthe view of bodies in the retail supply chain, and combs the financial system of thischain. We raise an all-purpose frame of supply chain financing model, and makepertinent model-designing and product-matching on the base of "1+N" normalformulas.Secondly the thesis studies retail supply chain game of a lead supplier and tworetailers under no funding constraints. We construct the model according to the thoughtof Stackelberg Game, and prove that there is only one optimal pricing strategy ofsupplier and optimal ordering policy of retailer.The third, we research the retail supply chain game model considering fundingconstraints, and testify there is only one optimal pricing strategy of supplier and optimalordering policy of retailer under this condition The sensitivity analysis of funds holdingsproves that the suppliers’ optimal pricing is inversely proportional to the retailers’ fundsholdings and the suppliers’ maximum profit, the maximum profit and optimal ordering policy of retailer are all proportional to the retailers’ funds holdings in the fundingconstrains of retailers in effect condition. This analysis testifies that the suppliers’optimal pricing under funding constrains of retailers in effect condition is higher thanthat under no funding constrains of retailers condition; and suppliers’ maximum profit,retailers’ optimal ordering and maximum profit are all lower than that under no fundingconstrains of retailers condition. The lack of funds leads to the loss of profits.In the end, the thesis search the retail supply chain considering supply chainfinancing, proving that there is only one optimal pricing strategy of supplier and optimalordering policy of retailer under this condition. The sensitivity analysis of financing costtestifies that suppliers’ optimal pricing and maximum profit, retailers’ optimal orderingand maximum profit are all inversely proportional to the financing cost coefficientunder the funds constraints and supply chain financing condition. We find that suppliers’optimal pricing steadily increases separately in funds constraints and non-supply chainfinancing, no funds constraints and funds constraints in effect and supply chainfinancing. Suppliers’ maximum profit, retailers’ optimal ordering and maximum profitare all steadily increasing in funds constraints and non-supply chain financing, fundsconstraints in effect and supply chain financing, and no funds constraints.