Research On Participants Behavior Game Of B2C E-commerce Credit Mechanism

In this era of rapid development of information, we can see electronic shoppingeverywhere, while the B2C e-commerce is most popular. At the same time，Thereare many E-commerce credit problems. In recent years, the problems about theInternet Fraud,"brush credit" arise endlessly that seriously affect the development ofB2C e-commerce. Therefore, this thesis mainly study B2C e-commerce that basedon the electronic platform, game analysis on the participants’ behavior in thetransaction,in the last give advices on the establishment and improvement of themechanism of e-commerce trust.In this thesis, I make game research on participants’ behavior that in differenttransaction section.The whole process is divided into three parts: game betweenenterprises, game between consumers and enterprises and e-commerce platform andenterprises. Based on the analysis of each stage, I create four game models, itinvolves static bayesian game, repeated game, model of signalling, I use this modelsto analyze e-commerce credit problems. Different enterprises have different creditrating which have different impact on making a strategic decision about commodityprice, enterprises with high credit rating will set a relatively high price, while ifenterprises with high credit rating, but lower price,the corporate will be suspectedas "brush credit"; the origin of enterprises carry out a transaction with bad integrityis opportunistic. making a transaction with bad integrity will earn higher thanmaking a transaction with integrity; Analyze the influence of the extent ofsupervision and the punishment of e-commerce platform on the e-business enterprisecredit, at the same time by using model of signaling to tell the e-commerce platformprovider should not just concern the punishment after the event, while should bestrengthened regulatory before the event, mainly concern on regulatory rather thanpunishment.There are five conclusions in my thesis:(1) we use the concept of e-commerce platform provider. In our country thecurrent situation is that e-commerce enterprises is mainly based on the e-commerceplatform position, There are few enterprises create a site by itself. It is cost for an enterprise to establish itself e-commerce sites, it also has a lot of trouble aboutmaintenance. By using existing e-commerce platform, it will not only eliminate thecost of website construction and maintenance, but also can make use o f thereputation of the site to build enterprise’s reputation. So it is necessary to make aresearch between e-commerce platform provider and enterprises.(2) The game between the customer and vendor is repeat. By modeling analysis,the company’s profit will always greater than zero whether the company do businesswith integrity or fraudulent (that also is power of the company do business withfraudulent), but company with long-term development goals do not want just to dobusiness with customer once. what encourages company to choose do long-termbusiness is the profit of integrity is higher than fraudulent’s. By improving customerloyalty, increasing the punishment and providing unobstructed communicationchannels can encourage company choose frankness.(3)Game behavior between the companies is simply about pricing, gamebetween different companies of selling the same product with different credit onpricing strategy, company with low credit will set a relatively low price to make upfor their lack of credit. Sales on internet is different from sales ontraditional,company’s credit is also a kind of hidden costs that will affect the pricingof the product. The cost of selling the product that company with high reputationwill be high, then the price of the product will be relatively high; I also come to aconclusion that the amount between price increase and credit rating increase is notstrictly increasing, but with the increase of credit rating, the rate of price increaseswill become smaller. Customer should pay attention to companies with high creditrating but low price when purchase goods, because the high reputation of thesecompanies is likely to be obtained through abnormal means and also likely toprovide poor quality products.(4) Game between the e-commerce platform providers and enterprises isdynamic, e-commerce platform provider will release formulation of the regulatorypolicy, under the various regulatory policies enterprises will make their dicision.Through studies we know that with greater supervision, the profit of company withfraudulency will be lower and the power of cheating is weaker too;the punishmentthe more powerful, the company’s profit is more smaller, the power of cheating ismore weaker too; company that emphasis on short-term will get higher fraudulentprofit that will power their possibility of fraud. At the same time,high supervision and punishment will low the regulatory cost; that also tell the e-commerce platformprovider that should pay more attention to the company with for short-term goals.Also concluded that the more damage of the company do business with fraudulencyon the reputation of the site, the more powerful supervision of the e-commerceplatform provider will take.(5)At the same time we should establish credit evaluation mechanism betweenthe e-commerce platform providers, should not just evaluate the users of theplatform, so that the e-commerce platform provider will have pressure to try theirbest to manage the users. By establish Model of Signaling in the link beforetransaction that a very important link for supervision, I give some advice for thee-commerce platform provider to strengthen supervision in some aspects of theenterprise. E-commerce platform provider should pay more attention on supervisionbefore transaction rather than punishment, this is a big problem in this moment,strengthen investigation of the information credibility before transaction is a keyelement to improve e-commerce credit.