The Quality Of Information Disclosure, The Institutional Environment, And Debt Financing

Debt financing has been an important source of funding for enterprises, animportant role of the credit market is that the rational allocation of funds in the market,as the representative of the bank loan in the credit markets, hoping to reduceborrowing enterprises due to information asymmetry through full disclosure ofinformation credit of mismatch risk，hoping to recover the full amount of principal inthe stipulated time，the maximum interest rate，as the demand for loans by enterprisesnot only want to get the full amount of the borrower funds, and also want to minimizeinterest rate，the bank has a basis quality of corporate accounting information，thewishes of the loan contract provisions to protect their own interests. The high-qualityinformation disclosure can effectively reduce the credit risk of the bank，to ease thedebt financing constraints faced by the company.Using normative research and empirical research method of combiningasymmetric information theory, signal transmission theory, theory of soft budgetconstraints, the debt contract theory rely on theoretical analysis of different borrowertypes, different economic backgrounds, and institutional environment the quality ofaccounting information disclosure on the impact of debt financing; verified throughempirical analysis under different conditions, the quality of information disclosure foradditional bank borrowings affect the difference.Our special institutional environment for research, empirical research on thedata of China’s Shenzhen A-share listed companies in2009. This paperspecifically examines the level of information disclosure on corporate debt financingin different system environments. The following conclusions:(1) the higher thequality of information disclosure by the bank’s favor, get more bank borrowings;(2)with respect to long-term borrowings, the quality of information disclosure is moresignificant positive correlation between the new short-term loans；(3) financial crisisweakened the positive correlation between the quality of information disclosure onnew bank loans；(4) in the high level of the market, government intervention into low and high levels of the rule of law area, the quality of information disclosure on thenew bank borrowing more significant influence. The conclusions of this paper willimprove credit decision-making behavior of Chinese commercial banks to provide atheoretical basis for policy recommendations, but also provides a guideline forenterprises to obtain bank loans: improve the quality of information disclosure.