Evolution Of The Urban Villages Reconstruction Model Based On The Game Theory

Since Reform and Opening-up, most of the urbans in our country have developed fastly, and the city scale expands unceasingly. City to expand towards periphery will take up a lot of collective land, and because the expropriation of collective construction land involves complex property rights and high compensation, so the city governments often choose to requisition the farmland and skip the collective construction land, which directly led to the emergence of a large number of urban villages. Due to the "dirty, disorderly and poor"problems in urban villages and scarce land resource of developed cities, city governments began to carry out urban village renovation. They generally adopted the "urbanization of landscape " measure, that is to demolish the original village reconstructions for redevelopment. However, the results of similar renovation are not ideal. The prominent problem is that the compensation standard is low, so villagers strongly resist the urban village reconstruction. At the same time,the property law and a ban on "administrative compulsion relocation " issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources will not permit local governments to take "administrative compulsory demolition" measure at will to harm the interests of the villagers.some local governments actively explore how to maintain the villagers’ rights and interests, and have found some practices which are revealing. Shenzhen is most representative who delivers the Land Development Rights to the subjects of right in the urban village reconstruction and allows the subjects of right to reconstruct urban villages by themselves or in collaboration with other subjects,which maintain the interests of the villagers for the most part. Reconstruction models of urban villages in Shenzhen have undergone a series of major changes, from the government-led renovation, then to allow village collective and market players to take part in renovation and finally to permit the subjects of right to reconstruct urban villages by themselves. So the theme of this article is to explore how reconstruction models of urban villages in ShenZhen evolute.The article mainly includes two parts: (1) Policy research. The author summarizes and analyzes ShenZhen policies about urban village renovation. And according to the time of important policies and policy characters during different period of time, the policy evolution process is divided into four stages:the stage of disorderly construction by the villagers, the stage of formation of urban villages, the stage of formation of urban village reconstruction policy, the stage of development of the urban village reconstruction policy.The first stage, the government introduces mandatory policy and set red boundary on the village construction to limit the villagers’development and construction activities; The second stage, the ShenZhen government repeatedly plays game with the villagers about illegal construction to acquire collective construction land; The third stage, the government seeks cooperation with the villagers and encourage rural collective economic organizations and rural cooperative stock companies to participate in the urban village renovation; The fourth stage, ShenZhen government clearly put forward that the undertakers for reconstruction can be land rights subject, the rural collective economic organization, market main body or the government, which embodies the pluralism.(2) Game theory analysis. In this article, an analytical model is constructed based on the theory of institutional change, land development right and game theory to explain why the reconstruction models of urban villages evolute. After analysis, we know that the factors who push forward land development rights to shift from government to the right subjects include:policy prohibiting administrative compulsory demolition; high landvalue and widespread illegal buildings result in high removal cost and due to fiscal problems, the government can only assume low compensation standerd for land acquisition, which makes it difficult to reach a deal with villagers; villagers barely live in the village, some of which even have moved overseas, and all homes rent for benefit, so negotiation has some difficulty; close traditional clan in village and rural joint-stock cooperative company make the villagers to form "common body in benefits" which can improve their own power in games.