The Tournament Problem Based On The Agents’ Contribution And Multitask

With the continuous development of the economy, the competitions of enter-prises become talents’ competitions. The compensation incentive system is notonly a powerful means of attracting, retaining and motivating the talents, butalso plays a role of economic leverage. With the compensation incentive becom-ing more and more important, how to strengthen the motivation to the agents hasbecome a very important problem of enterprise management. The tournament isone of the most common and efective relative performance payment mechanismsand has already gained the extensive concerns of the academia and business cir-cles. With the diversification of staf tasks, it is more difculty to measure theemployees’ performance. Research of tournament based on the agents’ contribu-tion and multi-task is of great significance for increasing the practicality of thetournament mechanism.Firstly, this dissertation studies a tournament problem based on the agents’contribution, on which the principal’s revenue function is based. The tournamentproblem can be classified into two types according to whether the agents’ contri-bution can be perfectly reflected by the agents’ objective performance. At first,assuming that the agents’ performance can reflect the agents’ contribution per-fectly, a tournament model based on the agents’ contribution is established. Thenthis dissertation relaxes the supposed condition and considers that the agents’performance is imperfect. And the homogeneous and heterogeneous tournamentmodels based on the agents’ contribution are established to maximize the incomeof the principal. The equivalent form of these three models and the optimal solu-tions of them are given. Compared to the traditional tournament, the principalin the tournament based on the agents’ contribution achieves higher payofs.Next, this dissertation studies a multi-task tournament problem in which thediferent tasks are complements at the margin in the principal’s payof function. Abasic multi-task tournament model is developed with the purpose of maximizingthe principal’s payofs. The discussions about how the heterogeneity of the agents and the heterogeneity of tasks afect the agents’ efort selections are given in afew kinds of scenarios.The main innovation is to first consider the tournament models based onthe agents’ contribution, in which the principal achieves higher payofs than thatof the traditional tournament models. In addition, this paper first considers amulti-task tournament problem in which the diferent tasks are complements atthe margin in the principal’s payof function.