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Concerning The Incentive Mechanism Of The State-Owned Enterprises On Principle-Agent Theory

Posted on:2009-07-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G F ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360272490753Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The state-owned business enterprise is a pillar of our country national economy; the state-owned business enterprise reformation is whole a center for economy system reforming link. The development and reformation of the state-owned enterprise is an important foundation of the social and national stabilization. We set great store by the reformation of the state-owned enterprise. The thought and way of the reformation of state-owned business are advancing in exploration. For a long time, the incentive-restriction mechanism of the state-owned enterprise is one of the hottest topics. Because of the political environment, economic environment, social cultural environment and the internal conditions of the enterprise, the problem of the incentive-restriction mechanism of the state-owned enterprise still remains unsolved. And it leads to the inefficiency and dilemma of the state-owned enterprise. In this paper, entrepreneur is the soul of an enterprise, plays an important role in the enterprise. He guides the development direction of the enterprise, and ensures the success of the enterprise. The enterprise will develop efficiently with the help of motivation for an entrepreneur and a clear relationship between an entrepreneur and investor. What's more, the relationship between an entrepreneur and investor is a kind of principle-agent relation. The relationship also exists in the state-owned enterprise. So, establishing model from the principle-agent theory, researching the incentive mechanism of the enterprise is a good way to see how the incentive mechanism works in the state-owned enterprise. Moreover, this paper discusses an on-duty consumption situation. Under this situation, the incentive effects of annual salary incentives and shareholding incentives will change; the income of an enterprise will be difference with the situation that without on-duty consumption. According to the analysis on principle-agent model, the methods in constructing a good incentive-restriction mechanism of the state-owned enterprise are discussed. And also, some useful opinions on the state-owned enterprise reformation are proposed.
Keywords/Search Tags:Principle-agent, Incentive mechanism, On-duty consumption
PDF Full Text Request
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