An Empirical Analysis Of The System Of Shareholders’Right To Know

The shareholders’ right to know has the foundational status in the system of shareholders’ rights. For shareholders, the shareholders’ right to know is the basis and premise of other shareholders’ rights; For companies, shareholders’ right to know is the guarantee of company’s benign operation; For the whole society, shareholders’ right to know is to realize the economic driving force for the development of the self.With the constant improvement of the company law, the protection of shareholders’ right to know has also been gradually strengthened. However, in the face of increasingly complex social and economic activities, the shareholders’ right to know in the field of dispute is increasingly complicated. Lawmakers in the design of the law benefit more from the perspective of macro controls the company and the shareholders’ interests, not enough provisions to protect shareholders’ right to know, which in turn influenced on the premise of right to know of shareholders a host of other rights.In the new company law has no correction, no judicial interpretation of cases, the courts at all levels in the treatment of the problem in the field of shareholder’s right to know differences can appear even when they contradict each other. After analyzing several cases of a magic weapon of Peking University, the author sums up four major problems in practice, they are:shareholders of plaintiffs subject qualification, the scope of shareholders’ right to know, The allocation of burden of proof between shareholders and company, Shareholders audit objective justification. The author tried to comprehensive consideration different court cases, and combine the legal theory, put forward his own opinions and suggestions.