Research On Optimization Of Manufacturers’ Incoming Inspection Based On The Balance Of Consumer And Producer Risk

Product quality is the key for enterprises to get their customers, and keeping high quality of products is the basic condition to maintain their competitive advantages. However, the traditional quality management theories and methods consider internal quality control in enterprises rather than external process and relationships. With the wide application of supply chain management, enterprises in supply chain have new requirements on quality management. Especially in recent years, serious problems of product quality in supply chain emerged frequently, which made the research on quality management and collaboration based on supply chain become the focus of current research.In supply chain, the formation of the final product quality is closely related to the quality of raw materials and components provided by suppliers. In research of supply chain quality management, supplier certification, incentive and guaranteed treaty are usually applied to control supplier quality. While incoming inspection, as a basic and direct means, does not get enough attention. Therefore, this study proposed optimization model of manufacturers’incoming inspection based on the balance of consumer and producer risk. On one hand the model can help incoming inspection to play an important role to prevent supply chain product quality problem, on the other hand the model considers consumer and producer risk and reduces inspection costs, which can help to coordinate cooperation relationship between enterprises in supply chain.First of all, this study proposes research question combined with the research background, analyses research purpose and significance, determines main research contents and technology roadmap, and summarizes the theories of quality inspection and sampling inspection and the literature review of supply chain quality management, supply chain quality inspection and sampling inspection, which lay the foundation for the research to optimize manufacturers’incoming inspection.Second, this study focuses on the analysis of supply chain characteristics, including transitivity of supply chain quality risk, information asymmetry between enterprises and the selfishness of supply chain members, and the analysis of manufacturers’incoming inspection, including all inspection, none inspection and sampling inspection. By analyzing the effects of supply chain characteristics and incoming inspection on final product quality, this study concludes the relationship between supply chain characteristics and manufacturers’incoming inspection and the overall thought to optimize manufacturers’incoming inspection, including meeting manufacturers’quality requirement, balancing consumer and producer risk and reducing inspection costs.Third, based on the overall thought to optimize manufacturers’incoming inspection, this study builds model of consumer and producer risk and model of incoming inspection costs. The risk model aims at the maximum risk quantitatively that both manufacturer and supplier accept, and the constraints are to meet manufacturers’ requirements on the nonconforming rate in received batch and suppliers’requirements on the conforming rate in rejected batch. This risk model considers both manufacturers’ and suppliers’interests. The costs model aims at the minimum cost of manufacturer incoming inspection, and the constraints are to meet the maximum risk that both manufacturer and supplier accept. This costs model achieves the optimization of manufacturers’incoming inspection based on the balance of consumer and producer risk. By models solution and analysis, both of the models are verified and have two conclusions.(1) The maximum risks that both manufacturer and supplier accept are related to nonconforming rate of supplier’s products. With the nonconforming rate increasing, the maximum risk that supplier accepts increases, and the maximum risk that manufacturer accepts decreases.(2) When the supplier’s products quality is better, the manufacturer’s inspection cost of optimal decision is lower while the probability of acceptance is higher. When the supplier’s products quality is worse, the manufacturer’s inspection cost of optimal decision is lower while the probability of acceptance is lower.At last, this study summarizes the main research achievements, analyzes the lack of research and puts forward the direction for the next phase of the research.