Research On Incentive&Restrictive Models Of Cooperative Innovation In Complex Product System

Since the beginning of the21st century, complex product system becomes more and more important in the development of the national economy. At the same time, because complex product system is composed of a large number of subsystems and modules, the system integrator need to join forces with other enterprises and research institutions which are responsible for the development tasks of some difficult subsystems or modules. Thus, cooperative mode is valued and used wisely. However, due to some factors like information asymmetry, the cooperative units may take opportunistic behavior to damage the benefits of the cooperative innovation. Therefore, in order to improve the level of cooperative innovation in complex product system, it is significant to explore effective methods of incentive and constraint to prevent the cooperative units from opportunistic behavior.Based on above, this paper provides a research of incentive and restrictive models of cooperative innovation in complex product system.First of all, this dissertation reviews the existing research of the complex product system and cooperative technology innovation at home and aboard. After that, a case of U.S. F-35fighter is applied to point out the system integrator must take a scientific and reasonable incentive strategy to mobilize the enthusiasm and creativity of cooperative units so as to improve the level of cooperative innovation. By analyzing the patterns and relationships of cooperative innovation in complex product system, the research indicates that the patterns should be divided into fixed payment mode and output sharing mode. Meanwhile, the difference of relationship between cooperative innovation in complex product system and general project is that the core of project management in complex product system is to deal with the relationship of the system integrator and cooperative units.In the next part, combining the principal-agent theory with characteristics of complex product system, this dissertation establishes the basic incentive and restrictive models of fixed payment mode and output sharing mode. On the base of these models, the optimal solutions under the conditions of symmetric information and asymmetric information are discussed. Because the relationship between the system integrator and cooperative units belongs to loose union, those incentive contracts without penalty are invalid. Consequently, penalty is introduced into the models to increase the force of constraint. On the other hand, in view of the risk of technological innovation, the probability of innovation success is introduced too. Therefore, compared with the general principal-agent model, the models of this dissertation are not only in line with the characteristics of cooperative innovation in complex product system but also more instructive.Furthermore, in consideration of knowledge and technology spillover effect caused by the exchange of information and staffs between the system integrator and cooperative units, knowledge and technology spillover effect are induced into the basic models, so that the models based on spillover effect are explored. Then, the optimal solutions of fixed payment mode and output sharing mode under the conditions of symmetric information and asymmetric information are discussed.Finally, specific cases are applied to verify the basic models and the models concerning spillover effects. Meanwhile, through sorting and refining the results of this study, the conclusions and further research prospect of this dissertation are systematically summarized.