Differences In The Equity Incentive Motivation Of Listed Companies Impact On The Debt Maturity Structure

Since the1950s equity incentive appears, it has been the research focus of many scholars. The optimal contract theory is the traditional view of the equity incentive, and it suggests that equity incentive can improve the company’s performance. However, with the end of the1990s the United States known as the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals appeared, people began to question the implementation of equity incentive motivation of the company, and formed a management rent-seeking theory. Since January1,2006, China’s listed companies equity incentive management (tentative) formally implemented so far, has been more than seven years. As of the end of2012, there were388equity incentive plan announced, involving311companies. What motives are these companies implementation of equity incentive? And what impact on the company’s decision-making?Based on the above background, this study uses the A-share listed companies of announcement equity incentive programs during the2006to2010period as sample. On the basis of the relevant research, this study use the optimal contract theory and management rent-seeking theory as a theoretical basis, and use a combination of research methods of theoretical deduction and empirical research to distinguish the implementation of equity incentive motivation. And further examine under the motives of the optimal contract or the management rent-seeking, the company’s debt maturity structure changes before and after the announcement, as well as the debt maturity structure differences in the comparison of the two motives. The results show that the listed company equity incentive motivation differences can really affect the company’s debt maturity structure, and get the following conclusions of the study:(1) For the implementation of equity incentive companies with the motivation of the optimal contract, compared with the equity incentive program prior to the announcement, the lower the proportion of short-term debt after the announcement of equity incentive programs;(2) For the implementation of equity incentive companies with the motivation of the management rent-seeking, compared with the equity incentive program prior to the announcement, the higher the proportion of short-term debt after the announcement of equity incentive programs;(3) After the implementation of equity incentive, contrast with the company for the motivation of management rent-seeking, the lower the proportion of short-term debt of the company for the of the optimal contract.